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FAIR USE VS. FARED USE: THE IMPACT OF
AUTOMATED RIGHTS MANAGEMENT ON
COPYRIGHT'S FAIR USE DOCTRINE
ToM W. BELL"
In this Article, Professor Bell examines the impact of new
technologies on copyright's fair use doctrine. The Article
examines the prospective capabilities of automated rights
management technologies to monitor and track the exchange of
information in digital intermedia, such as the Internet, that would
enable copyright holders to bill consumers for use of their works.
Professor Bell argues that these billing capabilities will cause a
transformation in copyright law: a system of "fared use" will
radically reduce the scope of the "fair use" defense. Upon
examination of the effects of such a transformation, Professor Bell
posits that a system of fared use actually may offer freer access to
expressive works. Professor Bell argues that allowing copyright
owners and consumers to exit copyright law and freely contract
under a fared use system in time may reveal a system more
beneficial than one preempted by federal copyright law.
Professor Bell concludes by urging lawmakers and academics to
await the emergence of new automated rights technologies and
allow experimentation in the market to dictate copyright law's
adaptation to such new technologies, rather than requiring new
technologies to adapt to the traditional fair use doctrine.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Information wants to be free," claim those who decry the over-
zealous enforcement of copyrights.1 But they cannot mean what they
1. See David Stipp, The Electric Kool-Aid Management Consultant, FORTUNE, Oct.
16, 1995, at 160, 166 (characterizing "information wants to be free" as the "eyberhacker
rallying cry," and attributing it to Stewart Brand). For a recent explication of this claim,
see Interview by Frontline with Stewart Brand, founder of the WELL online service, in
San Francisco, Cal. (June 15, 1995), available at <http://www2.pbs.org/wgbhlpages/
frontline/cyberspacelbrand.html> (visited Oct. 3, 1997) ("[T]he net ... is basically a gift
economy .... For a company or business to get into the net, they need to join that way of
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say. Information wants nothing at all.2 This contemporary epigram
instead reveals, indirectly, what people want. Perhaps it originated as
a mere prediction about the difficulty of enforcing intellectual
property rights on the Internet and in other digital intermedia?
Facing newly effective means of enforcing such rights, however, those
who claim "information wants to be free" increasingly give the slogan
a normative spin. Its meaning then boils down to this: people want
information for free.'
So restated, the catch-phrase still rings true. All else being
equal, who would not prefer to get information-that increasingly
vital good-at no cost? But, alas, information never comes for free.
We can only account for its costs as fully as possible, try our best to
minimize them, and allocate them fairly.
The information economy balances fixed and variable costs from
several sources. On the one hand, consumers necessarily bear costs
when they search for, interpret, and collect information. This holds
true even when-perhaps especially when-the fair use defense to
copyright infringement allows a consumer to avoid paying cash for
the right to use an expressive work.5 On the other hand, information
providers necessarily bear costs when they create, package, and
distribute information. They thus seek remuneration and profit
through licensing fees, at least so far as the countervailing fair use
defense and various practical hurdles will allow.'
One method in particular offers information providers a
promising way to increase their licensing opportunities: automated
doing things and so typically it means giving away software .... It means often giving
away content.").
2. To hold otherwise would require one to embrace a sort of digital animism, and to
attribute cognitive states to mere collections of bits, or to rely on an outmoded, scholastic
notion of causation. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, bk. II, ch. 3, 194a33 (R.P. Hardie &
R.K. Gaye trans., c. 335-320 B.C.), reprinted in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
332 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (describing final causation as "the sense of end or that
for which a thing is done").
3. This Article uses "digital intermedia" to refer to the Internet, circuit-switched
networks, and other interactive channels over which digital information gets distributed
and through which automated rights management can function. "Digital intermedia"
does not encompass such comparatively non-interactive distribution channels as CDs,
CD-ROMs, and digital audio cassettes.
4. Stewart Brand actually came fairly close to this sense in an early formulation of
his now-widespread aphorism: "Information wants to be free because it has become so
cheap to distribute, copy and recombine-too cheap to meter. It wants to be expensive
because it can be immeasurably valuable to the recipient." STEWART BRAND, THE
MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTURE AT M.I.T. 202 (1987).
5. See infra Part III.A.1.
6. See infra Part III.A.2.
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rights management ("ARM").7 ARM enables information providers
to enforce standard copyright claims mechanically, without resort to
the threat of litigation. It also allows copyright owners and others to
create and enforce contracts that specify other sets of rights.'
Although ARM may give information providers newfound power to
control the use of their wares, it does not necessarily justify that
control. The proper legal response to ARM thus remains an open-
and vital-question.
ARM portends far-reaching and unprecedented effects on rights
to information in the new digital intermedia. Specifically, ARM
threatens to reduce radically the scope of the fair use defense to
copyright infringement.9 ARM will interact with existing legal
7. This Article favors "automated rights management" as the most exact label for
the processes at issue. Terminology in this new field remains in flux, however.
Alternative terms, rejected here as either too broad or narrow, include "trusted systems,"
see Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems, Sci. AM., Mar. 1997, at 78, 78, available at
<http:llwww.sciam.comO397issue/O397stefik.html> (visited Nov. 5, 1997); "copyright
management," see WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS passim (1995) [hereinafter NII WHITE PAPER]; Julie E. Cohen, A
Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace,
28 CONN. L. REV. 981, passim (1996); "rights management," see Mary Grace Smith &
Robert Weber, A New Set of Rules for Information Commerce-Rights-Protection
Technologies and Personalized-Information Commerce Will Affect All Knowledge
Workers, COMM. WK., Nov. 6, 1995, at 34,34; Robert Weber, Digital Rights Management
Technologies passim (Oct. 1995) (unpublished report to the International Federation of
Reproduction Rights Organizations) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
"copy-protection," see Technological Solutions Rise to Complement Law's Small Stick
Guarding Electronic Works, INFO. L. ALERT, June 16, 1995, at 3, 4 [hereinafter
Technological Solutions]; "transcopyright," see Theodor Holm Nelson, Transpublishing
and Transcopyright (visited Nov. 5, 1997) <http:llwww.sfc.keio.ac.ip/
-ted/transpub.transco.html>; and "telerights," see Wade Riddick, From Copyright to
Telerights, BYTE, Feb. 1996, at 248,248.
8. See infra Part II.A (describing the functions of ARM). ARM encompasses a
variety of technologies, including: encryption, firewalls, and passwords to limit access to
information; digital watermarks and stegonography to identify electronic documents; and
micropayments and embedded applications to ensure that users pay for protected
information.
9. See David Post, Battle or Dance?, AM. LAW., Jan./Feb. 1996, at 116 (observing
that due to automated rights management, "'transaction costs'-of negotiating a license
fee for each use of a copyrighted work, however trivial and insignificant-are rapidly
disappearing," and raising the question: "Once tracking and payment mechanisms of this
kind are in place, is there still a place for fair use?"); David G. Post, Controlling
Cybercopies; Leaping Before Looking; Proposals Would Make Unsettling Changes,
LEGAL TIMES-SPECIAL REPORT; INTELL. PROP., Apr. 8, 1996, at 39,45 [hereinafter Post,
Controlling Cybercopies] ("[A]lthough one may retain the theoretical legal right to make
fair use of material, where rights holders are permitted to use powerful technological
means to control access to their works, fair use may prove illusory.").
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doctrines to supplant fair use" with an analogous but distinctly
different doctrine: fared use." Part II of this Article details the
causes of this transformation and closes with a worst-case scenario.
Part Im, in contrast, catalogs the benefits of fared use. It
describes the legal id practical scope of fared use and defends it as
not only efficient, but equitable." Fared use would make copyrighted
works in the digital intermedia available under reciprocal quasi-
compulsory licenses. Although consumers might have to pay fees
that the fair use defense would excuse in other media, they would in
return gain better access to better information. Fared use would not
necessarily cost consumers more, however, because the fair use
doctrine now imposes considerable hidden costs.' Though they
might win increased licensing fees under fared use, copyright owners
would, thanks to a diminished but still potent fair use defense, have
to endure greater exposure to the objectionable reuse of their works.
A default rule of fared use would create a new public bargain
between consumers and copyright owners that would largely flow
from the interaction of ARM with current law. Part IV argues,
however, that consumers and providers of information should have
the right to shape alternative licensing systems through private
agreements. Although we cannot yet discern exactly what sort of
rights to information would evolve under contracts backed by
ARM-an excellent reason for lawmakers to avoid premature
meddling in the field' 4-- a plausible accounting shows that the public,
10. Broadly speaking, the fair use defense covers certain unauthorized uses of a
copyrighted work, such as in commentary or scholarship, that do not displace the
copyright owner's potential licensing fees. See infra note 20.
11. Very broadly speaking, fared use would require consumers to pay for the right to
access and reuse information, rather than appealing to a statutory fair use exception. See
infra Part I.A.
12. Although some aspects of fared use have yet to come to pass, we have much to
gain from proactively preempting the difficult legal problems that originate with the onset
of new technologies. See Tom W. Bell, Virtual Trade Dress: A Very Real Problem, 56
MD. L. REV. 384,388 (1997).
13. Such hidden costs include the uncertainty created by the fair use doctrine's
uncertain boundaries, the losses passed on to consumers by copyright owners who lose
licensing revenue due to fair use, and various other costs. See infra Part II.A.3.
14. The NIl White Paper has drawn exactly this criticism by calling on lawmakers to,
among other things, outlaw devices that could negate copyright protection and penalize
tampering with copyright management information. See, e.g., Post, Controlling
Cybercopies, supra note 9, at 45; Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan.
1996, at 134, 136 [hereinafter Samuelson, The Copyright Grab]; Pamela Samuelson,
Technological Protection for Copyrighted Works 22-27, 33 (Feb. 14, 1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Samuelson,
Technological Protection], available at <http://sims.berkeley.edu/-pam/
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as well as the contracting parties, can benefit. Entrepreneurs can
create a world where information costs less than it does under fair
use, and perhaps even one where the public gets paid to consume
information. To encourage experimentation, therefore, lawmakers
should not flatly invalidate fared use agreements that skirt
preemption. Rather, they should allow information consumers and
providers to exit freely from copyright law into contract law.
The impact of technological advances on copyright has
generated a large and interrelated body of commentary. It thus bears
noting what the present Article does not concern. It does not address
how automated rights management might affect consumers' privacy."5
Nor does it spend much time on the comparatively easier question of
how ARM might interact with the first sale doctrine. 6 Despite this
Article's occasional cites to the recent NIl White Paper," it leaves
detailed criticism of that controversial document to others." Broad
questions about the justifiability and continued viability of copyright
law exceed the bounds of the present inquiry.9 The feasibility and
courses/cyberlaw/docs/techpro.html> (visited Nov. 5, 1997).
15. For recent treatments of this important topic, see generally Cohen, supra note 7
(evaluating the import of digital monitoring of individual reading habits in the context of
traditional notions of freedom of thought and expression); A. Michael Froomkin, Flood
Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed
Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 486-88 (1996) (discussing business profiling of Web
users).
16. The first sale doctrine, codified at § 109 of the Copyright Act, specifies that
copyright law does not prevent the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord to sell or
otherwise dispose of it at will. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994). The first sale doctrine does not
affect ARM transactions, however, because they more closely resemble licenses than
sales. Furthermore, Congress and the courts have made it quite clear that the first sale
doctrine does not preempt contracts controlling post-sale use of copyrighted works. See
American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that
the first sale doctrine does not bar contract suits); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180,
1187 (9th Cir. 1977) (same); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5675-76 (same).
17. See supra note 7.
18. See, e.g., Post, Controlling Cybercopies, supra note 9, at 45 (criticizing the Nil
White Paper for proposing potentially revolutionary changes to online information use
without providing adequate justification or allowing adequate discussion); Samuelson,
Technological Protection, supra note 14, at 14-35 (questioning the wisdom of the NIl
White Paper's provisions regarding protection of copyright management information).
19. For interesting treatments of this issue, see generally OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE U.S., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION (Apr. 1986), available at <http:ll
www.wws.princeton.edu/-ota/ns20/alpha-f.html> (visited Nov. 5, 1997) (questioning the
copyright paradigm); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970)
(giving skeptical consideration of the instrumental need for copyrights); Negativland, Fair
Use (visited Oct. 3, 1997) <http://www.eff.org/pub/Intellectual-property/fair-use.article>
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desirability of relying solely on contracts and trade secrets to protect
expressive works deserves more attention, but the scope of that
particular issue demands a separate article.
Both friends and foes of copyright can find something of use in
this Article. It provides the former with a defense of widespread
licensing and the latter with a graceful exit to a copyright-free world.
Readers who hold the middle ground, preferring fuzzy copyrights and
broad fair use privileges, may find the present account a bit bracing.
Ultimately, though, they will find that the fared use system described
here achieves many of their most cherished policy goals.
II. THE FUTURE OF FAiR USE?
However esoteric a topic to the rest of the world, the proper
scope of the fair use doctrine ° evokes heated debate among people
who peddle information for a living.2' A confluence of recent events
has especially alarmed scholars, librarians, and other parties who rely
(questioning private ownership of mass culture's elements); Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents
and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects,
13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817 (1990) [hereinafter Palmer, Patents and Copyrights]
(arguing on philosophical grounds that copyrights unjustifiably and unnecessarily rely on
state sanctions); Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and
Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261 (1989) [hereinafter Palmer, Intellectual
Property] (making a similar argument on historical and economic grounds); John Perry
Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in
the Digital Age, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84 (describing alternatives to copyright based on
the relationship between information providers and consumers rather than on the
possession of information).
20. Codifying the common law defense of fair use, § 107 of the Copyright Act
provides that
the fair use of a copyrighted work... for purposes such as criticism,
comment,... scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use...;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion [used] ... ; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). Despite the enumeration of these four factors, however, the fair
use defense "is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine
it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569,577 (1994).
21. Compare generally, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY (1994)
(arguing for giving fair use a narrow scope), with Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, supra
note 14 (arguing for a broad definition of fair use). See also, e.g., Coalition for Networked
Information, Coalition CNI-COPYRIGHT Forum (visited Nov. 5, i997)
<http://www.cni.org/Hforums/cni-copyright> (advancing various viewpoints on this topic
in ongoing discussions).
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on the fair use defense in conventional media." From technical
advances in automated rights management, described by Subpart A,
and recent developments in copyright law, described by Subpart B,
these parties forecast a dystopia, described by Subpart C, where fair
use will have virtually disappeared from the digital intermedia.
A. Automated Rights Management
Owners of conventional sorts of property do not rely on the law
alone to protect their assets. They also deploy fences, locks, and
guards. Automated rights management provides the owners of
intangible assets with similar defensive mechanisms, albeit ones built
into computer hardware and software and implemented via firewalls,
encryption, and passwords. Although ARM researchers continue to
develop and experiment with a variety of approaches, the huge
market for intellectual property protection virtually ensures that
ARM technology will see increasingly widespread use.'
ARM appeals to information providers because it stands to give
them the power to accomplish two things that hitherto seemedimpossible in digital intermedia. First, ARM will make it possible
and cost-effective for information providers to enforce standard
copyright or trade secret claims. Second, ARM will empower them
to enforce contracts that define different or additional rights.24
Additionally, ARM promises to perform these functions cleanly and
effectively; without resort to uncertain and wasteful litigation.
Until very recently, the promise of automated rights
management remained just that: a mere promise. With so much to
22. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106
YALE L.J. 283, 285-87 (1996) (describing the debate between "neoclassicists," who regard
expressive works as commodities, and "copyright minimalists," who argue that new
technologies render copyright irrelevant, and advocating as an alternative a "democratic
paradigm" under which copyright advances political and social discourse). Readers intent
on applying Professor Netanel's labels to the current work will find that it borrows
"neoclassical" methods to preserve values shared with the "democratic paradigm" while
opening a voluntary exit to the "copyright minimalist" world.
23. See Christine Hudgins-Bonafield, Selling Knowledge on the Net, NETWORK
COMPUTING, June 1, 1995, at 102, 102, available at <http:/techweb.cmp.com/
nwc/607/607feature2.html> (visited Nov. 6, 1997); Otis Port, Copyright's New Digital
Guardians, Bus. WK., May 6, 1996, at 62, 62; Riddick, supra note 7, at 248; Ira Sager,
IBM's Tollbooth for the I-Way, Bus. WK., May 13, 1996, at 114, 114; Smith & Weber,
supra note 7, at 34; Stefik, supra note 7, at 78-79; Technological Solutions, supra note 7, at
3-4; Weber, supra note 7, at 9.
24. It also gives information providers new-found power to "profile" consumer
behavior, a development that threatens consumers' privacy. See Cohen, supra note 7, at
985-87.
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gain at stake, however, researchers worldwide have been striving to
perfect ARM technology.2s A wide variety of ARM systems already
have left laboratories and entered the marketplace.6 IBM has
convinced thirty companies, including America Online, Yahoo!, and
Xerox, to employ its ARM technology.2 Competitor Electronic
Publishing Resources, Inc. ("EPR") has signed agreements with
National Semiconductor and the Copyright Clearance Center.2 As
typically occurs with a new networking technology, these and other
ARM providers have struck up a variety of shifting consortia.29 Such
activity indicates that copyright owners and information providers
soon will have access to robust ARM technology from one or more
sources.
30
Subscription services, which charge for access to proprietary
databases by the hour or month, currently account for most of the
intellectual property sold through digital networks.31 Although even
25. See generally Hudgins-Bonafield, supra note 23 (discussing research in ARM);
Imprimatur, Issues: Monitoring and Managing Use (visited Nov. 5, 1997)
<http'//www.imprimatur.alcs.co.uk/imprimatur/IRM/xrmonuse.htm> (discussing various
ARM proposals); Smith & Weber, supra note 7, at 34 (discussing research in ARM);
Stefik, supra note 7, at 79-80 (same).
26. See Port, supra note 23, at 62 (discussing products offered by Digimarc Corp.,
DICE Co., Electronic Publishing Resources Inc., and Release Software Corp.); Sager,
supra note 23, at 114 (discussing IBM's InfoMarket); Smith & Weber, supra note 7, at 36
(discussing Electronic Publishing Resources Inc.'s InterTrust architecture and IBM's
InfoMarket); Technological Solutions, supra note 7, at 3-4 (discussing Infosafe Systems'
Design Palette and National Semiconductor's iPower unit); Custom Innovative Solutions,
Web Copyright Management System (visited Nov. 6, 1997) <http://www.cise.com/
bin/webright.cgi?fle=cprtlmain.html> (describing, demonstrating, and offering for sale
"WebRight" ARM system).
27. See Sager, supra note 23, at 114. For an introduction to IBM's InfoMarket, see
InfoMarket (visited Oct. 7,1997) <http://www.infomarket.ibm.com>.
28. See Hudgins-Bonafield, supra note 23, at 108; Technological Solutions, supra note
7, at 4.
29. See Sager, supra note 23, at 114; Smith & Weber, supra note 7, at 37;
Technological Solutions, supra note 7, at 4. See generally Hudgins-Bonafield, supra note
23 (discussing agreements between ARM providers).
30. See Weber, supra note 7, at 9-12, 19-21 (discussing factors influencing the
development of a standard for ARM). Some commentators claim that IBM's early entry
into the ARM field, and the superiority of its Cryptolope technology, ensure that it will
set the standard for later developments. See Sam Albert, Surprise! IBM May Crash the
Internet Party, COMPUTERWORLD, June 10, 1996, at 41, 41. Others bet that EPR's
comprehensive patents give it an edge. See Technological Solutions, supra note 7, at 3.
At any rate, it looks unlikely that federal authorities will mandate a particular type of
ARM system. See NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 233 ("Copyright owners should be
free to determine what level or type of protection (if any) is appropriate for their works,
taking into consideration cost and security needs, and different consumer and market
preferences.").
31. See Hudgins-Bonafield, supra note 23, at 105-06 (describing the operation of
1998]
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this sort of electronic tollbooth qualifies as "automated rights
management" in a broad sense, most ARM technicians aspire to
something more sophisticated. At a minimum, they aim at
permitting information providers, and perhaps even individual
owners of proprietary data, to sell access on a document-by-
document basis.
The simplest such pay-per-use systems offer encrypted
documents for sale, or rather the keys to those documents, one at a
time. The purchaser of a key gets access to a single locked
document.33 This approach still leaves the purchased information
subject to subsequent copying in its original medium, however.'
More sophisticated ARM systems thus employ methods such as
steganography,35 micropayments,' and imbedded applications37 to
give information providers exact and continuous control over
proprietary information."
At its most powerful, ARM supports the "superdistribution" of
services such as Lexis-Nexis); see also I. Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright and
Preemption in a Digital World, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 9 (1995), available at
<http//www.urich.edu/ -jolt/vlil/hardy.html> (visited Nov. 5, 1997) (discussing satellite
signal scramblers); Richard Rapaport, In His Image, WIRED, Nov. 1996, at 172, 175
(describing how Corbis uses passwords and watermarks to sell images through its online
digital gallery).
32. After all, subscription services rely on automated processes (dedicated lines and
passwords, for example) to manage rights to proprietary information.
33. See Port, supra note 23, at 62; Smith & Weber, supra note 7, at 34; Technological
Solutions, supra note 7, at 3; Weber, supra note 7, at 3-4.
34. See Smith & Weber, supra note 7, at 34 ("Once the information is unlocked,
customers can do whatever they wish with it, including making digital copies,
redistributing it to friends and colleagues, printing many copies and so on."); Weber,
supra note 7, at 3-4.
35. Using steganography, an information provider can firmly fix its digital signature,
sort of an electronic watermark, on the documents it sells. See Port, supra note 23, at 62.
Steganography also has cryptographic applications-it can hide "secret writings" in other
documents-that relate to ARM only indirectly.
36. A micropayment is simply a very small payment, perhaps even on the scale of a
fraction of a penny. Retail micropayments appeal to information providers because they
lower consumer resistance to paying for information and yet can generate considerable
revenues in the aggregate. See Hudgins-Bonafield, supra note 23, at 106; Smith & Weber,
supra note 7, at 37; Weber, supra note 7, at 19-20.
37. Imbedded applications attach to and travel with the documents protected by
ARM. These mini-programs can thus continue to control how consumers use the
information that they purchase-even past the point of sale. See Hudgins-Bonafield,
supra note 23, at 106-07; Sager, supra note 23, at 114, 116; Smith & Weber, supra note 7,
at 36-37; Technological Solutions, supra note 7, at 3; Weber, supra note 7, at 5-6.
38. See Hudgins-Bonafield, supra note 23, at 106, 108; Port, supra note 23, at 62;
Riddick, supra note 7, at 248; Sager, supra note 23, at 114, 116; Smith & Weber, supra
note 7, at 36-37; Stefik, supra note 7, at 81; Technological Solutions, supra note 7, at 3;
Weber, supra note 7, at 3-7.
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proprietary information. In other words, it allows information
providers to market documents that disallow certain types of uses
(e.g., copying) and provide continuing revenue (e.g., charging 20 per
access) regardless of who holds the document (e.g., including
someone who obtained it post-first sale).'9  Superdistribution thus
offers information providers a rather daunting compendium of
powers. In practice, of course, no ARM system can guarantee
absolute control over information, especially after it escapes digital
media.4 By accident or design, documents inevitably will fall outside
the reach of ARM. Even if only partially effective, however, ARM
will radically improve the efficiency of licensing practices in the
digital intermedia. Consequently, it will have a radical impact on the
fair use doctrine.
B. Fair Use Shrinks as Licensing Grows
1. American Geophysical and Princeton University Press
Current case law makes it harder for defendants to benefit from
the fair use defense to the extent that plaintiffs make it easy to pay
licensing fees. The Second Circuit in American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, Inc. ,4 expressly supported this view.42 The Sixth Circuit
panel in Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services,
Inc. ,4 rendered a holding to the contrary, until vacated and subjected
to an en bane rehearing. The Sixth Circuit's final, binding opinion
strongly endorsed the reasoning of the American Geophysical court.4
In American Geophysical, eighty-three publishers of scientific
and technical journals joined in a class action copyright infringement
suit against Texaco, alleging that the defendant had made
unauthorized photocopies of individual articles from their
39. See Hudgins-Bonafield, supra note 23, at 106, 108; Port, supra note 23, at 62;
Riddick, supra note 7, at 248; Sager, supra note 23, at 114, 116; Smith & Weber, supra
note 7, at 37; Technological Solutions, supra note 7, at 3; Weber, supra note 7, passim.
40. "There are always limitations to rights management and content control
technologies. Nothing will prevent someone from scanning a printed page of a protected
document (although fingerprinting or digital watermarking techniques may make it easier
to trace and prosecute such infringements)." Weber, supra note 7, at 11-12; see also
Stefik, supra note 7, at 80 ("A computer user can always print a digital page and then
photocopy it. A digital-movie pirate can sit in front of a screen with a camcorder.").
41. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), cerL dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995).
42. See id. at 930-31 (holding that copying journal articles is not fair use where
payment and licensing opportunities existed through Copyright Clearance Center).
43. 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cerL denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
44. See id. at 1387 ("The approach followed by Judges Newman and Leval in the
American Geophysical litigation is fully consistent with the Supreme Court case law.").
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publications.' Among other defenses, Texaco cited fair use." It lost
in the district court, 7 appealed to the Second Circuit, and lost yet
again.'
The outcome of the case turned on the crucial fourth factor of
the fair use defense,4 9 which requires a court to consider "the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work." ' O Citing the district court's findings of fact, the court of
appeals held that the publishers had, with the help of the Copyright
Clearance Center, created "a workable market for institutional users
to obtain licenses for the right to produce their own copies of
individual articles via photocopying."'" This made it difficult for
Texaco to claim that its unauthorized copying had no impact on
revenue the plaintiffs might have earned from their copyrights. As
the court of appeals explained, "the right to seek payment for a
particular use tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth
fair use factor when the means for paying for such a use is made
easier.0
2
Because he disputed whether the plaintiffs had created a
workable market for licensing copies of individual articles, Judge
Jacobs dissented. Absent such a market, he opined, the majority's
reasoning ran in circles: "[T]he market will not crystallize unless
courts reject the fair use argument that Texaco presents; but, under
45. See American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 914-15.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 914.
48. Seeid.
49. See id. at 926-32.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994); see also supra note 20 (listing the four factors for fair
use established in § 107). The Supreme Court has described this fourth factor as
"undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use." Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,566 (1985). "[T]o negate fair use one need only show
that if the challenged use 'should become widespread, it would adversely affect the
potential market for the copyrighted work.'" 1d. at 568 (emphasis added) (quoting Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)). Notably,
however, the American Geophysical court seemed more impressed by the Supreme
Court's refusal in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., to reiterate the importance of the
fourth factor, quoting that case's instruction that" '[a]ll [four factors] are to be explored,
and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.'" American
Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 926 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
578 (1994)). The court in Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc.,
disagreed with such a reading: "We take it that this factor, 'the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,' is at least primus interpares ...
99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
51. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 930.
52. Id. at 930-31.
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the statutory test, we cannot declare a use to be an infringement
unless (assuming other factors also weigh in favor of the secondary
user) there is a market to be harmed."53
The majority opinion rebutted this accusation, explaining that
"[t]he vice of circular reasoning arises only if the availability of
payment is conclusive against fair use." 4 The majority thus tested
Texaco's copying against all of the fair use factors set forth in § 107 of
the Copyright Act, and limited consideration of the fourth factor to
the impact on "traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed
markets."'55 In this case, the court found, the market in question
already existed. Therefore, "[w]hatever the situation may have been
previously, before the development of a market for institutional users
to obtain licenses," the American Geophysical court reasoned, the
development of such a market made it "now appropriate to consider
the loss of licensing revenues."56  The court determined that
congressional intent supported its decision.'
The majority might have added that, so far as the dissent's
accusation of circularity applies, it applies equally well to the
presumed alternative of freezing fair use in the face of technological
advances. If the law refuses to allow copyright owners to benefit
from reduced transaction costs, they will not pursue the technological
innovations that would make such reductions possible. 8 Failure to
53. Id. at 937 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 931 (emphasis added). But cf. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487
F.2d 1345, 1357 n.19 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (holding that in the absence of convincing proof of a
viable market, "one cannot assume at the start the merit of the plaintiff's position, i.e.,
that plaintiff had the right to license," but that "[t]hat conclusion results only if it is first
determined that the photocopying is 'unfair' "), affd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S.
376 (1975).
55. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 930; see also Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting the fair use defense
for copying that unfavorably impacted on plaintiffs' ability to collect permission fees
through an existing licensing system).
56. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 930. The court thus distinguished Williams &
Wilkins Co., where no such market had existed and, thus, no right to license fees had
arisen. See id. at 930-31 (citing Williams & Wilkins Co., 487 F.2d at 1357-59).
57. See id. at 931. The court noted that first, § 108 of the Copyright Act "narrowly
circumscribes the conditions under which libraries are permitted to make copies," which
"implicitly suggests that Congress views journal publishers as possessing the right to
restrict photocopying." Id. (citations omitted). Second, Congress's prompting of the
development of the Copyright Clearance Center, see S. REP. No. 93-983, at 122 (1975); S.
REP. No. 473, at 70-71 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 33 (1967), suggests its belief "that
fees for photocopying should be legally recognized as part of the potential market for
journal articles." American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 931.
58. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 358 (1989) ("[Flair use, if too broadly interpreted, might
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upgrade the fair use doctrine would thus ensure that neither
producers nor, notably, consumers enjoy all the benefits that the
digital intermedia might otherwise offer. 9
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc.60
presented the Sixth Circuit with a copyright infringement case
strongly reminiscent of American Geophysical. Princeton University
Press and other publishers jointly sued the defendant copy shop for
reproducing excerpts from their copyrighted works in course packs it
sold to university students.6 1 Here, as in American Geophysical, the
defendant bypassed a mechanism for paying licensing fees and
instead pleaded the fair use defense.62 In the Sixth Circuit's first
attempt at resolving Princeton University Press, the panel reversed
the district court's ruling in favor of the defendant.' Like the dissent
in American Geophysical, the judges found the plaintiff's argument
circular.' The panel failed to convince its colleagues on the Sixth
Circuit, however; sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit vacated the panel's
decision.'
In reconsidering the issue, the Sixth Circuit in Princeton
University Press closely followed American Geophysical and held that
"[w]here... the copyright holder clearly does have an interest in
exploiting a licensing market-and especially where the copyright
holder has actually succeeded in doing so-'it is appropriate that
potential licensing revenues for photocopying be considered in a fair
use analysis.' "' The court similarly agreed with American
Geophysical that "[o]nly 'traditional, reasonable, or likely to be
developed markets' are to be considered in this connection." 7
Indeed, the court in Princeton University Press arguably did even
more than the American Geophysical court did to ensure that the fair
use defense will shrink as licensing opportunities expand. In
American Geophysical, the court downplayed the significance of the
sap the incentive to develop innovative market mechanisms that reduce transaction costs
and make economic exchanges between copyright holders and users feasible.").
59. See supra Part II.A.
60. 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cer denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
61. See id at 1383.
62. See id at 1384. This mechanism could take up to four weeks to clear a request to
copy the protected works, see id, which strengthens the case for ARM. Because ARM
can clear rights instantly, it offers users a more workable alternative to fair use.
63. See id. at 1381.
64. See id. at 1407 (Merrit, J., dissenting) (discussing the panel's vacated decision).
65. See id. at 1383.
66. 1d. at 1387 (quoting American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913,
930 (2d Cir. 1994), cert dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995)).
67. Id (quoting American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 930).
[Vol. 76
COPYRIGHT'S FAIR USE DOCTRINE
one fair use factor that most strongly supports the rise of fared use-
the factor that requires a court to consider "the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work"%-by
interpreting the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., as an indication that the Court was "abandoning the idea
that any factor enjoys primacy."69 The Princeton University Press
court, however, read the precedents differently, stating that "[w]e
take it that this factor, 'the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work,' is at least primus inter
pares."7 By emphasizing that fair use should not cut into licensing
revenues, the Princeton University Press court helped to ensure that
fair use will wither as the use of ARM grows.
2. The NII White Paper and the NIICPA
Taken together, American Geophysical and Princeton University
Press demonstrate that courts considering the question have
concluded that the fair use defense should give way when copyright
owners can conveniently collect licensing fees. The executive branch
addressed this same question in the Nl White Paper1 and reached
the same conclusion.' The Nil White Paper's statutory proposals
have, moreover, drawn support in the legislative branch as the
National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act(,,NIICPA"). r
68. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994).
69. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 926. The Campbell Court held that "all [four
fair use factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the
purposes of copyright." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,578 (1994).
70. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1385 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994)) (citing
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,566 (1985)). As Harper &
Row Publishers predates Campbell, however, American Geophysical may very well have
the better argument.
71. See NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 7. The Nl White Paper represents the final
report of the Clinton administration's Working Group on Intellectual Property of the
Information Infrastructure Task Force. It surveys how current intellectual property law
might (or might not) work on the Internet and in other digital media, and it proposes
amendments to the U.S. Copyright Act.
72. The NII White Paper first raises the possibility that "technological means of
tracking transactions and licensing will lead to reduced application and scope of the fair
use doctrine," id. at 82, then observes that "the fair use doctrine does not require a
copyright owner to allow or to facilitate unauthorized access or use of a work," id. at 231,
and concludes that "[c]opyright owners should be free to determine what level or type of
protection" they want, id. at 233.
73. S. 1284, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995). Although these bills
stalled in the 104th Congress, international developments make them likely to resurface,
with better prospects, in the 105th. See John B. Kennedy & Shoshana R. Dweck, WIPO
Pacts Go Digital, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 27, 1997, at C1.
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The Nil White Paper predicts not only the advent of
comprehensive ARM systems,74 but also that such systems may "lead
to reduced application and scope of the fair use doctrine.
75
Moreover, it encourages this trend. Following the lead of American
Geophysical, the Nil White Paper would empower copyright owners
to use any "process, treatment, mechanism, or system" to deny access
to their works. 6 In response to claims that this would violate the
public bargain implicit in fair use, the NIl White Paper responds that
the doctrine "does not require a copyright owner to allow or to
facilitate unauthorized access or use of a work."'
To give effect to its arguments on how best to regulate digital
communications, the NIl White Paper suggests particular
amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976. These amendments
already have surfaced in Congress, taken word-for-word from the NIl
White Paper, and proposed in the NIICPA 9 Rather than expressly
requiring that courts limit the fair use defense insofar as
opportunities to pay licensing fees expand, the NIICPA merely aims
to protect-and thus encourage-ARM systems. It would do so by
adding to the Copyright Act a new Chapter 12, entitled "Copyright
Protection and Management Systems," including proposed §§ 1201-
04.
The NIICPA's proposed § 1201 prohibits devices or services "the
primary purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, remove,
deactivate, or otherwise circumvent ... any process, treatment,
mechanism or system which prevents or inhibits violation of any of
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner under section 106" of the
Copyright Act.'0 In effect, § 1201 almost certainly would prohibit
anti-ARM systems. The proposed § 1202 bars tampering with
74. See NH WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 191 ("Systems for managing rights in
works are being contemplated in the development of the NII. These systems will serve
the functions of tracking and monitoring uses of copyrighted works as well as licensing of
rights and indicating attribution, creation and ownership interests.").
75. Id. at 82.
76. Id. at 230. Some have argued, however, that American Geophysical does not
support giving copyright holders such powers. See James V. Mahon, Note & Comment, A
Commentary on Proposals for Copyright Protection on the National Information
Infrastructure, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 233, 258-59 (1996) ("American
Geophysical only applies to a narrow set of facts and cannot be relied upon to address
broad questions of fair use application.").
77. NiH WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 231.
78. See id. at App. 1.
79. See S. 1284, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995).
80. S. 1284 § 4 (proposed § 1201 of the Copyright Act); H.R. 2441 § 4 (same).
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"copyright management information,"8'  including "terms and
conditions for uses of the work,"' that copyright owners attach to
their digital works. Section 1202 thus also aims to make the world
safer for ARM systems. The NIICPA's proposed §§ 1203-04 give
teeth to these protections by imposing civil and criminal penalties,
including up to $500,000 in fines and five years in jail, for their
violation.
The NIl White Paper and the NIICPA so far represent mere
aspirations-not law. But they powerfully indicate that the current
administration intends to give the American Geophysical holding
broad effect. Though the intent of Congress remains uncertain, it has
not of late shown very much independence in matters relating to
digital communications) 4 At any rate, as the holdings in American
Geophysical and Princeton University Press indicate, the judicial
branch will not need the NIICPA to ensure that the fair use doctrine
shrinks in accord with the growth of ARM licensing schemes.
Indeed, the NIl White Paper and the NIICPA have justly drawn
criticism for doing far more to promote ARM than is necessary-or
wise.'
C. The Dystopian View
Parties who directly benefit from appeal to the fair use doctrine
in conventional media tend to fear the loss of those benefits in digital
intermedia. They thus regard with alarm the technical and legal
developments described above,' and argue that automated copyright
81. S. 1284 § 4 (proposed § 1202 of the Copyright Act); H.R. 2441 § 4 (same).
82. S. 1284 § 4 (proposed § 1202(c) of the Copyright Act); H.R. 2441 § 4 (same).
83. See S. 1284 § 4 (proposed § 1203-04 of the Copyright Act); H.R. 2441 § 4 (same).
84. Consider, for example, that the ill-fated Communications Decency Act of 1996
(codified in relevant part at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994)), was a product of wide, bipartisan
support. For judicial analysis of that statute, see ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.
Pa.) (enjoining enforcement of several sections of the Act on grounds of
unconstitutionality), aff d, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
85. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 990-91; Ann Okerson, Who Owns Digital Works?,
SC. AM., July 1996, at 80, 84; Post, Controlling Cybercopies, supra note 9, at 45;
Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, supra note 14, at 191; Samuelson, Technological
Protection, supra note 14, at 33.
86. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 19, at 207 (describing
scenario wherein "the public is dependent on the information provider for each and every
access made to a work, and the provider may be the sole source for the work");
SUBCOMMrITEE ON COURTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF STATEMENT OF THE NATION'S
LIBRARIES ON H.R. 2441, "NIl COPYRIGHT PROTECTION ACT OF 1995," (Feb. 8, 1996),
available at <gopher'//alal.ala.org70/00/alagophwashofflexecutive.summary> (visited
Nov. 6, 1997) (stating that in the stead of "society's currently balanced regime of shared
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management, combined with the doctrine that licensing can supplant
fair use, creates the prospect of a copyright dystopia.' This section
describes, in two related portraits, what friends of conventional fair
use fear. Section 1 describes a world in which the fair use doctrine no
longer forgives the refusal to pay licensing fees in digital intermedia.
Section 2 takes the same scenario a step further, describing a world in
which the fair use doctrine does not protect such uses as the
copyright holder finds objectionable. Critical analysis of these
scenarios follows in Part I.
1. The End of Unbilled Use in Digital Intermedia
Parties who make frequent appeal to the fair use doctrine fear
that they will not enjoy in digital intermedia the sort of immunity
from licensing fees that fair use provides in traditional media.'
information resources, ... a new, commercially grounded philosophy will 'trump' the
Copyright Act and all information, no matter how small the unit, can and will be licensed
or otherwise accessed only pursuant to contract"); Group of 100 Law Professors, An
Open Letter to Senator Hatch, Senator Leahy, Representative Carlos Moorhead, the
Honorable Ron Brown and Vice-President Al Gore, Regarding Legislative Implementation
of the NII White Paper, [hereinafter An Open Letter], available at
<http:llwww.clark.net/pub/rothman/boyle.htm> (visited Nov. 5, 1997) (same); Dennis S.
Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 511, 513 (1997) ("In the digital future, access to many works may be available only
to people who 'contract' in advance, for example .... not to further distribute the work or
anything contained in the work, ... not to quote from the work, and so forth. If these
'licenses' are uniformly enforceable, all of the users' rights of copyright will soon
disappear."); Netanel, supra note 22, at 285 ("[S]uch technological fences would raise the
specter of all-consuming copyright owner control."); Okerson, supra note 85, at 82-83
(noting that cash-strapped library and education groups foresee a "nightmare future"
where "nothing can be looked at, read, used or copied without permission or payment");
Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, supra note 14, at 136 ("[A] user who has copied even a
paragraph from an electronic journal to share with a friend will be as much a criminal as
the person who tampers with an electrical meter at a friend's house in order to siphon off
free electricity."); Stefik, supra note 7, at 78 ("Some legal scholars believe.., that
publishers will be left with too much power, undercutting the rights and needs of
consumers and librarians."); Technological Solutions, supra note 7, at 7 (same);
Samuelson, Technological Protection, supra note 14, at 24 (worrying whether "the public
domain is a viable concept in the electronic environment").
Professor Goldstein, at least, offers a notably different take on the issue:
The capacity of the celestial jukebox to post a charge for access, and to shut off
service if a subscriber does not pay his bills, should substantially reduce the
specter of transaction costs. As these costs dissolve, so, too, should the
perceived need for safety valves such as fair use.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 224.
87. See Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation of Computing and Information Technology:
Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509, 513-14 (1996) (discussing the
utopian and dystopian models of cyberspace).
88. See SUBCOMMITEE ON COURTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 86("The browsing, non-commercial sharing, and limited reproduction of works for
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Because a copyright does not give its owner the right to require
licensing fees for uses falling within the scope of § 107,'9 parties
availing themselves of fair use typically regard it as free use.' The
prospect of paying in digital intermedia for what apparently comes
free elsewhere thus evokes contempt, if not horror, from those who
re-work information for a living.9' It seems certain, however, that the
educational and scholarly purposes now protected by statute will be available only to
those able to pay for access to information. Such a regime threatens to make America a
nation of information haves and have-nots."); An Open Letter, supra note 86 ("[The Nil
White Paper's] inversion of fair use doctrine and its maximalist stance toward intellectual
property rights seem to presage a country divided among information 'haves' and 'have-
nots' in which the Clinton Administration's promise of universal access would be lost.");
see also Okerson, supra note 85, at 82-83 (describing a "nightmare future" envisioned by
libraries and education groups); Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, supra note 14, at 136
(describing a future where "a user who has copied even a paragraph from an electronic
journal ... will be as much a criminal as the person who tampers with an electrical meter
... to siphon off free electricity").
89. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (codifying the fair use defense). For discussion of this
point, see supra Part ll.B.
90. Given that producers bear costs to produce copyrighted material, and that
consumers bear search and other transaction costs for even unbilled access, fair use does
not in fact qualify as free use. See infra Part III.A.1. Whether fair use qualifies as
subsidized use poses a more difficult question.
On one view, § 107 sets forth fair use as a conspicuous exception to the
comprehensive rights granted to copyright owners under § 106, expressly excusing certain
parties from making normally required payments. The subsidy thus appears in the form
of a statutorily mandated transfer of wealth from copyright owners to those who claim the
fair use defense. See NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 84 (rejecting an interpretation
of fair use that implies "that copyright owners should be taxed-apart from all others-to
facilitate the legitimate goal of 'universal access' "); see also 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT § 10.1, at 10:1 (2d ed. 1996) ("Courts have for more than a century excused
certain otherwise infringing uses of copyrighted works as 'fair' uses.").
On another view, the property right defined by the Copyright Act never includes fair
use, so refusing to enforce fees for such use does not redistribute wealth from copyright
owners, or the public at large, to those engaging in fair use. Thus, never having had the
right to bill for fair use, the copyright owner loses nothing to its exercise. See, e.g., Peter
Jaszi, Taking the White Paper Seriously, Part 2 (visited Nov. 6, 1997)
<http:/lcweb.loc.gov/nac/nac3O/jaszi-2.html> (Library of Congress Network Advisory
Committee, Network Planning Paper No. 30) (criticizing the NIl White Paper for its
"6novel description of 'fair use' as a 'tax' on the defined preexistent content of proprietary
rights-rather than an inherent part of the definition of those rights themselves");
Samuelson, Technological Protection, supra note 14, at 27 (same).
91. However, not all of them share this contempt. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note
21, at 236 ("[Copyright's historic logic [is] that the best prescription for connecting
authors to their audiences is to extend rights into every comer where consumers derive
value from literary and artistic works."); Stefik, supra note 7, at 78-79. And even those
who regard the spread of licensing fees with apprehension sometimes admit that they can
only guess at the actual impact. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 22, at 295 ("Expanded
control may increase the private cost of reading, viewing, and listening to authors'
expression to such an extent that, in some cases and for some people, access becomes
prohibitively expensive. [But] digital technology may make possible highly refined price
discrimination that could, in theory, alleviate this problem .... "); see also, e.g., id. at 295
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combination of automated rights management and the legal doctrines
set forth in American Geophysical,2 Princeton University Press,3 the
NI White Paper,' and the NIICPA95 will have just such an effect.
The sort of copyright nightmare that friends of fair use fear
unfolds something like this:96 Imagine that you download some
quotes from text on the Church of Technolism's web page,
incorporate them in an essay critical of the Church, and publish it on
your own web page without seeking the Church's permission. The
Church of Technolism objects to your comments and demands that
you cease republishing quotes from its online document. You refuse.
Although the Church sues for copyright infringement, you rest easy
in your faith that the fair use defense will excuse your copying. But it
does not.
The court finds not that you have quoted too much, but rather
that you have paid too little. Although you quoted no more than
what your critique required, you neglected to pay the Church of
Technolism for your republication of its copyrighted materials.
Citing American Geophysical, Princeton University Press, the NI
White Paper, and the recently enacted NIICPA, the court holds that
the advent of convenient and cheap means of making licensing
payments forecloses your claim that paying for your use would have
proven too burdensome. In short, as automated rights management
has grown in scope, your fair use defense has shrunk.
As this scenario illustrates, the near future may hold some
changes for the fair use doctrine. Whether these changes qualify as
beneficial or detrimental will come under consideration in the next
Part. The next section will first show, however, that fair use faces
something more worrisome than ubiquitous licensing fees. The same
events that conspire to end the unbilled use of copyrighted works in
digital contexts, together with related factors, threaten to constrain
n.39 ("The extent to which copyright may pose significant barriers to ... access will
depend on a number of factors .... Much theoretic and empirical work needs to be
done .. ").
92. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that reproduction of copyrighted works is not
fair use where convenient payment and licensing schemes exist), cert dismissed, 116 S. Ct.
592 (1995).
93. 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that reproduction of copyrighted works is
not fair use vhere payment and licensing schemes exist), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336
(1997).
94. NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 7.
95. S. 1284, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2441,104th Cong. (1995).
96. This scenario owes more than a little to the facts underlying Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
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severely the sorts of critical commentary and parodies that copyright
owners so often find offensive.
2. Private Censorship by Copyright Owners
Increasingly, consumers in all probability will find that access to
information in digital intermedia comes subject to contractual
provisions that aim to secure fights more broad than those provided
by the Copyright Act.' Consumers will find, in particular, that such
contracts inhibit or forbid uses that would otherwise arguably fall
within the scope of the fair use defense. IBM's entry into the market
for ARM services, for example, specifies that consumers signing onto
its InfoMarket Service "may not copy, modify, adapt, reproduce, [or]
translate ... any information delivered or accessed via the Service."98
This proposed agreement clearly aims to foreclose appeals to the fair
use defense.
Despite their vocal concerns about losing unbilled use in digital
contexts, champions of fair use have made comparatively little noise
about the potential impact of such contractsY To bring that impact
into focus, let us briefly return to the hypothetical nightmare in
progress:.. The court holds not only that you have no right to use the
Church of Technolism's copyrighted materials without paying, but
that you have no right to use them without permission. The Church
97. Legal scholars have already encountered such restrictions in the form of
limitations that Lexis and Westlaw impose on use of their services; they routinely limit
how long users can electronically store downloaded documents. For a more recent
example directly tied to an ARM system, consider Registered User Agreement for IBM
InfoMarket Service (visited Nov. 6, 1997) <http:lwww.infomarket.ibm.comlht3/tc.htm>.
98. Id. (describing limits under "General"). A fuller quote reads: "IBM or its
Suppliers own or have licenses to the intellectual property rights to all components of the
Service. Unless IBM specifies otherwise, you may not copy, modify, create derivative
works based upon, adapt, reproduce, [or] translate... any aspect of the Service." Id.
99. But see Technological Solutions, supra note 7, at 7 ("A deeper problem is how to
insure that consumers can gain access to works under the fair-use doctrine ... if owners
keep them under cryptographic lock and key. Many publishers have historically viewed
fair use as a necessary evil .... "); Netanel, supra note 22, at 294-95 (expressing a similar
concern about the impact of ARM on fair use); see also Cohen, supra note 7, at 1003-19
(discussing the impact on First Amendment values of access contracts that violate
readers' privacy).
100. In addition to facts from Netcom, this scenario draws inspiration from comments
in Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 905, 907
(E.D. Mich. 1994) ("Sometimes, plaintiffs will grant permission to copy an excerpt at no
charge; other times they may deny permission altogether .... "), aff d in part, vacated in
part on reh'g, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
Under the actual facts in Princeton University Press, however, the only refusal to license
arose where a publisher preferred to sell a whole book rather than the right to reproduce
portions of it. See Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1388.
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has cited not only its rights under copyright law-a claim weakened
by the policies underlying the fair use defense-but a contract arising
out of your willing use of the particular service that controls access to
the Church's web page. That contract gives the Church of
Technolism the right to prevent any and all quotations of the text
from its web page. Thanks to that contract, you find that you cannot
buy your way out of copyright infringement. The Church of
Technolism thus wins as its remedy not payment of the lost licensing
fees, but rather an injunction on your unauthorized use.
Chilling though this scenario may sound, it remains technically
and legally plausible. Copyright owners often evince a desire to
prohibit the critical, blasphemous, or satirical reuse of their works.1 '
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,12 the Supreme Court forbade
employing copyright law to achieve such censorship, of course. It did
not, however, expressly rule out using contract law to similar effect.
Though thin-skinned copyright owners might have it otherwise,
mass distribution in conventional media does not lend itself to the
imposition and enforcement of such anti-criticism contracts. The
digital intermedia, in contrast, deliver information through channels
ready-made to impose contracts limiting or forbidding fair use.
Moreover, automated rights management makes enforcing those
contracts wholly viable from a technical point of view.
As discussed more fully below, however, courts will probably
hold that the fair use defense gives consumers the right to engage in
limited critical reuses, ARM or not.1 Fair use will thus continue to
play a vital role, albeit a diminished one, in a world of otherwise
pervasive fared use. Contracts that interfere with the fair use defense
101. For example, after evangelist Jimmy Swaggart publicly confessed to having
purchased a prostitute's services, he tried to use his copyright in the confession to stop the
Cincinnati Opera from quoting him in an advertisement for its opera "Susannah."
Swaggart's attorney bluntly claimed: "They don't have the right to use material that
we've copyrighted." Chuck Conconi, Personalities, WASH. POST, June 17,1988, at D3; see
also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (involving an infringement
suit arising out of use of copyrighted music in a parody); Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980) (involving an infringement
suit arising out of the use of a competitor's magazine cover in a comparative
advertisement); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F.
Supp. 957 (D.N.H. 1978) (involving an infringement suit arising out of a politician's use of
an opponent's copyrighted material); Rapaport, supra note 31, at 283 (noting that
museums that granted permission to Corbis to sell copies of their works have retained
"veto power over 'inappropriate' digital uses").
102. 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (recognizing parody as a fair use).
103. See infra Part III.B.
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might risk federal preemption." Before addressing that particular
issue, however, the next Part examines how the fair use doctrine will
interact with the pre-contractual self-help measures that ARM will
make available to copyright owners in digital intermedia.
III. THE FuTuRE REVISITED: FROM "FREE USE" TO FARED USE
This Part critically evaluates the dystopian future of fair use
described above and describes fared use as a better and more likely
alternative. Subpart A finds that those who decry the end of unbilled
use in digital intermedia get the facts largely right but the valuation
wrong. The combination of ARM and existing law will indeed make
it easier for owners of copyrights in digital works to demand and
enforce licensing fees. Consumers have no sound reason to object to
paying such fees, however, and they have good reasons to welcome
the systemic effects of the resulting market for expressive works.
Subpart B argues that, absent contractual provisions to the
contrary, the fair use doctrine will continue to provide some
protection to critics, satirists, and others who offend copyright
owners. Subpart C explains how this, combined with the ubiquitous
license of such uses, will put the digital intermedia under a reciprocal
quasi-compulsory licensing scheme. In this spontaneously generated
fared use system, information providers license online expressive
works comprehensively but endure greater exposure to the offensive
reuse of their works.
Because ARM will enable information providers and consumers
to contract around this initial version of fared use, it may well end up
as no more than the default rule for defining rights to information in
the digital intermedia. Considering the likelihood and desirability of
that outcome must wait for Part IV, however. Re-evaluating
traditional fair use doctrine, and projecting how it will evolve into
fared use, merits attention first.
A. Fair Use Versus "Free Use"
Predictions that consumers will not generally enjoy unbilled
access to copyrighted works in digital intermedia appear to assess the
future accurately. For reasons set forth above, the advent of
sophisticated automated rights management will sharply lower
transaction costs for regulating the use of copyrighted materials. The
legal doctrine set forth in American Geophysical and Princeton
104. See infra Part IV.B.3&4.
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University Press, with or without the Nil White Paper's broad
interpretation of these cases, will limit the applicability of the fair use
doctrine online. New technology and current law will thus end up
partially supplanting the fair use defense in the digital intermedia.
For reasons set forth below, however, even parties who currently
benefit from applying the fair use defense in conventional media
should welcome this change.
1. Fair Use Is Not Free Use
Despite gross misconceptions to the contrary, fair use never
comes for free.' 5 One way or another, consumers using conventional
media must pay to browse magazines at newsstands, to photocopy
and distribute newspaper stories for spontaneous classroom use, to
search for quotes and type them into articles, and to otherwise avail
themselves of the fair use doctrine. Although such acts do not entail
paying licensing fees, they inevitably impose a variety of transaction
costs-for personal transport, manipulating paper and ink, searching
card catalogs, and so on-that follow from the very nature of
conventional media."°6 It makes no difference that consumers pay
licensing fees in cash whereas they pay fair use's transaction costs in
lost opportunities. Economically speaking, a cost is a cost."
The digital intermedia allow consumers to avoid or reduce such
transaction costs. Bits flow directly to homes and offices, copy easily
into RAM or magnetic storage, forward instantly to destinations
worldwide, and submit easily to electronic searches. Transaction
costs remain even here, of course. The burgeoning growth of the
Internet and other digital intermedia indicates, however, that
consuming bits very often costs less than consuming atoms. The
increasing reliance of legal academics on commercial online services,
CD-ROMs, and the Internet confirms this observation."8 Those who
105. The author credits Professor Jane C. Ginsburg, Columbia University School of
Law, for bringing this argument to his attention during a conversation in the winter of
1996.
106. See NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 11-17 (1995) (discussing the
differences between "the world of atoms" and "the world of bits").
107. Posner describes as "one of the most tenacious fallacies about economics" the
notion "that it is about money. On the contrary, it is about resource use, money being
merely a claim on resources." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 6
(3d ed. 1986).
10& See generally M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECrRONIC MEDIA AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF LAW (1989) (discussing the impact of new information
technologies on the practice of law); Robert C. Berring, Collapse of the Structure of the
Legal Research Universe: The Imperative of Digital Information, 69 WASH. L. REV. 9
(1994) (same).
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decry the advent of fared usei'9 thus err when they imply that it must
impose a net cost on consumers.' To the contrary, fared use offers a
considerable likelihood of providing more and better verified,
organized, and interlinked information, at less cost, than fair use does
now.il
2. Fixing Market Failure
Scholars have explained fair use in at least three ways: (1) as a
proxy for a copyright owner's implied consent;"' (2) as part of a
bargain between authors and the public, struck on their behalf first
by courts and then by Congress;"' and (3) as a response to a market
failure in private attempts to protect authors' expressions from undue
copying."' The first of these three explanations has fallen into
109. See, e.g., Okerson, supra note 85, at 82-83 (discussing the negative responses by
libraries and education groups); Samuelson, Technological Protection, supra note 14, at
26-27 (describing a "maximalist strategy for shifting power away from consumers and
toward publishers").
110. One ought, of course, to try to include all relevant costs in assessing the
displacement of fair use with fared use. It thus bears noting that some commentators
have claimed that a reduction in the scope of fair use would impose costs on society at
large by reducing public access to and reuse of copyrighted works. See, e.g., Netanel,
supra note 22, at 297 (claiming that the impact of expanded copyright enforcement on
"democratic discourse ... carries a social value far in excess of the aggregate price that
consumers would pay for personal access to transformative works"). Frustratingly,
however, these same commentators fail to support their claims with hard-or even soft-
numbers. Indeed, their arguments typically deny that the claimed costs even admit
objective evaluation. See, e.g., id. at 339 ("[Cjopyright's constitutive role in underwriting
the conditions for a democratic society [is] a social benefit that can neither be measured
nor reflected in terms of consumer purchasing decisions."(footnote omitted)). In fact, the
costs and benefits of the fair use doctrine do resist objective measurement-and this
provides yet another reason to welcome its reduced influence. See infra Part IV
(discussing the impossibility of calculating copyright's quid pro quo and why this supports
private in lieu of public ordering).
111. See Stefik, supra note 7, at 78-79 ("[C]onsumers' needs can be served even as this
transformation progresses. As technology brings more security, better-quality works will
reach the Net.... Although information might not be free, it will most likely cost less
because of lower expenses to publishers for billing, distribution and printing. These
savings could be passed on to consumers.").
112- See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05, at 13-151 (1997) (citing the notion disapprovingly).
113. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517,527 (1994) ("[C]opyright law ultimately
serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative
works .... "); 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 90, § 1.14 (discussing how U.S. copyright law
strives to achieve a balance between incentives and access); Robert A. Kreiss,
Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1, 20 (1995)
("The constitutional goals of copyright are the advancement of learning and knowledge.
The means to achieve those ends is the incentive system which induces authors to create
and disseminate their works.").
114. See generally 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 90, § 10.1.1, at 10:4 to 10:7 (discussing
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disfavor because it does not explain why fair use protects parody and
other uses of copyrighted material that owners find disagreeable.11
The second explanation receives due consideration below. 16  The
present subsection addresses the third explanation of fair use and
argues that, as a response to market failure, the fair use doctrine can
and should give way in the face of the effective enforcement of
authors' rights through automated rights management.
Lawmakers enacted the Copyright Act to cure an alleged case of
market failure: creating a work can cost authors a good deal,
whereas copying a work costs free riders very little."7 Absent special
protection from such copying, the argument goes, authors will
underproduce and the public will suffer. Copyright, as Justice
Holmes explained, therefore "restrains the spontaneity of men where
but for it there would be nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as
they saw fit;""' namely, copying others' expressions at will. Perhaps
examples in which transaction costs prohibit the formation of private licensing
agreements); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 passim
(1982) (arguing that fair use enables socially desirable transfers that the market would not
otherwise effectuate).
115. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (finding
fair use despite "the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical
reviews or lampoons of their own productions"); see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 112, § 13.05, at 13-151 ("It is sometimes suggested that fair use is predicated on the
implied or tacit consent of the author. This is manifestly a fiction .... " (footnote
omitted)); Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in
Markets for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 209, 228 (1985) ("[L]inking fair use to the copyright owner's consent, implied or
otherwise, to the infringement is a serious and unwarranted departure from well-settled
notions of private property." (endnote omitted)).
Defenders of the implied consent approach might argue that copyright holders need
not consent to particular fair uses, but only to the copyright system as a whole. See, e.g.,
Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 358-59 (explaining why publishers as a class benefit by
allowing even unfavorable reviewers to quote their books). But unless authors have a
real alternative to copyright's supposed bargain, which automatically grants protection
and allows fair use, attributions of consent look suspect. Part IV, infra, describes how
fared use might give rise to such an alternative.
116. See infra Part III.A.3.
117. See Gordon, supra note 114, at 1610-13; Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 326.
This exploration of the Copyright Act admittedly relies on a post facto interpretation of
legislators' often confused and impenetrable motives. Rather than deflating the dubious
notion that the Copyright Act embodies a natural rights view of copyright, however, it
suffices here to observe that free rider problems explain legislators' desire to protect even
copyrights qua natural rights, and that a natural rights view of copyright would, at any
rate, leave even less room for fair use.
118. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J.,
concurring); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Walls?: Speculations on
Literary Property in the Library of the Future, 42 REPRESENTATIONS 53, 59 (1993)
(noting that copyright law "has traditionally presumed a world in which, but for copyright,
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in the digital intermedia automated rights management will cure this
market failure by protecting authors' works through technological
and contractual means.119 ARM's other curative effects interest us
here, though.
Markets, like squeezed balloons, bulge outward where
unconstrained. In its attempt to protect authors from the
discouraging effects of unfettered copying, copyright law has thus
created market failure elsewhere. The costs of avoiding infringement
by obtaining permission to use a copyrighted work, and thus avoiding
infringement claims, often exceed the benefits of the desired use.
Such transaction costs threaten to prevent many socially beneficial
uses of copyrighted works from taking place. The doctrine of fair use
attempts to cure this particular market failure by excusing as non-
infringing a limited (though poorly defined) class of uses of
copyrighted works.' As Professor Gordon describes it, "courts and
Congress have employed fair use to permit uncompensated transfers
that are socially desirable but not capable of effectuation through the
market...'
Understanding fair use as a response to market failure does
much to explain the vagaries of its development in the case law."
More to the point, it lends support to the holding in American
Geophysical. Consistent with the market failure theory of fair use,
the court reasoned that "a particular unauthorized use should be
considered 'more fair' when there is no ready market or means to pay
for the use, while such an unauthorized use should be considered 'less
fair' when there is a ready market or means to pay for the use."' ' In
other words, the scope of the fair use defense rises and falls with the
transaction costs of licensing access to copyrighted works.
Automated rights management radically reduces the transaction
costs of licensing access to copyrighted works in digital intermedia.
Indeed, as its name suggests, it makes licensing automatic. Insofar as
unauthorized reproductions would be pervasive and unremediable").
119. See supra Part II (supporting this claim); see also infra Part IV.C (exploring how
ARM presages an exit from copyright law).
120. See Gordon, supra note 114, at 1614; Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 357-58.
121. Gordon, supra note 114, at 1601 (footnote omitted).
122. See id. at 1605 (arguing that "the presence or absence of the indicia of market
failure provides a previously missing rationale for predicting the outcome of fair use
cases"); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 357 ("The conventional view is that
no general theory can explain the cases that invoke the doctrine.").
123. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994),
cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995); see also Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan
Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381,1387 n.4 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting American
Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 931), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
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it responds to market failure, therefore, fair use should have a much
reduced scope when ARM takes effect. Should fair use disappear
entirely? Were ARM to abolish transaction costs, Coase's theorem
would suggest that the market would internalize all costs and permit
only value-maximizing transfers.24 ARM does not wholly negate
search and exchange costs, however, thus perhaps leaving contractual
gaps for fair use to fill. Furthermore, Congress employs fair use to
redistribute rights in accord with its particular notions of equity. The
defense thus excuses certain "socially beneficial" uses, such as
criticism and parody,"z that copyright owners might prefer not to
license.)' Fair use thus remains relevant, even given ARM. Exactly
how the two will interact to create a fared use system, and how well
that system accommodates the concerns that drive fair use, receives
consideration below.12
First, though, a cautionary reminder: no forecast of the probable
impact of ARM can overlook the fact that, just as ARM technology
may shape the law, the law will shape the development of ARM.
Although robust and sophisticated ARM technology would likely
curtail application of the fair use doctrine, unduly aggressive
application of the fair use doctrine might thwart creation of the
necessary technology'2 This risk should concern not only computer
scientists and information providers, but artists and audiences, too.
Stifling ARM would stifle the wide variety of new expressions and
experiences that the digital intermedia promise to inspire, promote,
and provide.'29
124. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 193 (1960).
125. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) ("[T]he
unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons
of their own productions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing
market."); see also Gordon, supra note 114, at 1633 ("Because the owner's
antidissemination motives make licensing unavailable in the consensual market, and
because the free flow of information is at stake, a strong case for fair use can be advanced
in these cases." (footnote omitted)).
126. As Professor Gordon stresses, however,
refusals to grant permission to license should ordinarily be honored.... When
an owner refuses to license because he is concerned that defendant's work will
substitute for his own work or derivative works, the owner is representing not
only his own interest, but also the interest of his potential customers and thus the
public interest.... Unfortunately, some courts seem to have viewed even some
legitimate refusals as justifying fair use treatment.
Gordon, supra note 114, at 1634 (footnotes omitted).
127. See infra Part IV.
128. See supra Part I.B.1.
129. See Gordon, supra note 114, at 1621 ("If copyright protection is denied because of
an otherwise curable market failure, then the additional revenues that would have flowed
584 [Vol. 76
1998] COPYRIGHT'S FAIR USE DOCTRINE 585
3. Maintaining Copyright's Quid Pro Quo
As courts and commentators often have noted, the Constitution
demands a public benefit as the price for the limited statutory
privileges that copyright creates."3 In contrast to the view that the
fair use doctrine represents a second-best response to pervasive
market failure, therefore, some commentators regard the doctrine as
an integral part of this constitutional quid pro quo. On this view,
from the new technological use will not appear. If the authors' revenues fail to reflect the
additional value that new technology gives to such works, then insufficient resources may
be drawn into their creation.").
130. The Copyright Clause states that "Congress shall have Power... To promote the
Progress of Science.. . by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Courts and commentators have
given a variety of formulations as to what sort of quid will balance the quo of copyright's
statutory monopoly. See generally 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 90, § 1.14, at 1:40 to 1:42
(discussing how U.S. copyright law strives to achieve a balance between incentives and
access). Compare Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50
(1991) ("The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' To this end, copyright assures authors
the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas
and information conveyed by a work." (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8)), with Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited
grant ... is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired." (emphasis added)), and Kreiss,
supra note 113, at 20 ("The constitutional goals of copyright are the advancement of
learning and knowledge. The means to achieve those ends is the incentive system which
induces authors to create and disseminate their works." (emphasis added)).
131. See Laura N. Gasaway et al., Amicus Advocacy: Brief Amicus Curiae of Eleven
Copyright Law Professors in Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services,
Inc., 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 183, 203 (1994) (claiming that "fair use [is] ... required by
[the] ... Copyright Clause"); Karjala, supra note 86, at 521 ("The free use of unprotected
elements of ... [authors'] works, ... and the fair use of even protected elements by
consumers and later authors are the quid pro quo that benefit the public in exchange for
the public's recognition of the exclusive rights of copyright."); L. Ray Patterson, Free
Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987) (arguing fair use is
"necessary for the partial fulfillment of the constitutional purpose of copyright-the
promotion of learning"); Pierre N. Leval, Comment, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1110 (1990) (describing fair use as "a necessary part" of the
copyright monopoly).
These scholars arguably read too much into the quid pro quo of the Copyright
Clause, however. The plain language of that provision does not require fair use. See, e.g.,
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1137, 1141 (1990) ("[The] utilitarian approach to copyright generally is supported by the
constitutional text and is accepted by most scholars. There is, however, nothing in the
Constitution ... to support ... extension of that approach to fair use in particular.").
Nor do the origins of the Copyright Clause support the view that it mandates limited
unlicensed access to copyrighted works. Early formulations of the Copyright Clause did
not allude to any sort of public quid pro quo, much less fair use. James Madison initially
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fair use provides a public benefit-unbilled access to copyrighted
works-to balance the State's grant of a limited monopoly.
Automated rights management at first appears to threaten this
bargain. It seems as if ARM restricts the public's access to
copyrighted works in digital intermedia without offering a benefit in
return. As this subsection's consideration of the issue shows,
however, friends of fair use should not assume that ARM will leave
the public worse off. To the contrary, it appears likely to provide a
net benefit to the public.
By reducing transaction costs throughout the market for
copyrighted expressions, ARM benefits the public both directly and
indirectly. Having emanated from an intentionally vague statute'32
and developed in various, occasionally contradictory cases,33 the fair
suggested that the Constitution provide Congress with the power "[tio secure to literary
authors their copy rights [sic] for a limited time." JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES
IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 477 (Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1893).
Simultaneous with Madison, Charles C. Pinckney moved, with unanimous consent, for the
following copyright clause: "To secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain time." Id.
at 478. Both Madison and Pinckney treated the subject matter of patents separately. See
id. at 477-78.
Prudential reasons for granting Congress the power to create copyrights, as well as
patents, first appeared in David Brearley's report from the Committee of Eleven, which
suggested giving Congress the power "[t]o promote the progress of Science and useful
arts by securing for limited times to authors & inventors, the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries." Id. at 580 (footnote omitted). The nearly identical,
final version followed immediately thereafter. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See
generally Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution,
17 GEO. L.. 109 (1929) (discussing which individual first introduced the idea to the
Convention).
Because nothing in this legislative history indicates what the Founders regarded as
the best means of promoting "the progress of Science," the Copyright Clause does not
require that the fair use defense assume any particular form. For that matter, strictly
speaking, it does not require a fair use defense at all. Courts and Congress have created
fair use in their discretion and in response to wholly contingent matters of fact. Though
this does not obviate the desirability of showing that ARM largely satisfies the particular
goals of fair use, it does reduce the issue to less-than-constitutional dimensions.
132. Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 specifies that courts "shall include" its
non-exhaustive list of factors in weighing the fair use defense. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
As Congress explained in codifying fair use in § 107, "the endless variety of situations and
combinations of circumstances that can rise [sic] in particular cases precludes the
formulation of exact rules in the statute." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5680.
133. As Judge Learned Hand once observed, the fair use doctrine "is the most
troublesome in the whole law of copyright." Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d
661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam). Far from an outdated dictum, this quotation has
been found "in nearly every major treatise, casebook, or law review article on the subject
of fair use." Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532,
1544 n.58; see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 13.05[A], at 13-154 (noting
that neither the case law nor § 107 "offer[s] any firm guide as to when" the fair use
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use doctrine necessarily blurs the boundary between valid and invalid
copyright claims. High risks of "theft"-here, infringement-
increase the insecurity of copyright's protection. Though the
resultant uncertainty obviously harms producers and sellers of
copyrighted works, it also harms consumers. Academics, artists,
commentators, and others. desirous of reusing copyrighted works
without authorization must borrow at their peril, consult experts on
fair use,' or, sadly, forego such reuse altogether. ARM's clarifying
power directly benefits those who would reuse copyrighted works-
and through them their public audiences-by creating harbors safe
from the threat of copyright litigation.'
Moreover, ARM benefits the public indirectly by increasing the
transactional efficiency of the market for expressive works.136 Like
other markets, the market for expressive works does not constitute a
zero sum game. And, as Coase observed of markets in general,
[i]t is obviously desirable that rights should be assigned to
those who can use them most productively and with
incentives that lead them to do so. It is also desirable that,
to discover (and maintain) such a distribution of rights, the
costs of their transference should be low, through clarity in
the law and by making the legal requirements for such
transfers less onerous. 137
defense applies).
134. Consider, for example, that consumers and academics confused about the scope
of the fair use doctrine routinely bombard the CNI-Copyright listserve with pleas for
guidance. See Coalition for Networked Information, Coalition CNI-COPYRIGHT Forum
(visited Nov. 5, 1997) <http'//www.cni.orgfHforums/ cni-copyright>.
135. Indeed, only by escaping the fair use doctrine's uncertainty can those who
administer ARM systems build in room for certain unbilled charitable and educational
uses. ARM can
respect the type of fair-use provisions that currently apply to libraries and some
other institutions, allowing a reasonable number of free copies or quotations to
be used. Members of the public with special needs-librarians, researchers and
teachers-could receive... licenses that let them make a certain number of free
or discounted copies of a work....
Stefik, supra note 7, at 81 (emphasis added).
Why not, then, simply use ARM to build all of fair use into the digital intermedia?
Because no one can define fair use with the required level of exactitude. See infra Part
III.A.4 (discussing the uncertainty inherent in the fair use doctrine); supra Part II.A
(same). "'If the legal community and government can agree on what fair use means we
can put it in place,' " an ARM expert observed. Technological Solutions, supra note 7, at
7 (quoting David Van Wie, chief technology officer at Electronic Publishing Resources,
Inc.). The legal community and government do not currently understand fair use,
however, in terms neat enough to fit into any programming language.
136. See supra Part II.A.
137. Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, in COASE, ESSAYS ON
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 3,11 (1994).
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ARM, by its systemic improvement of copyright's transactional
efficiency, helps us discover and maintain a distribution of rights to
expressive works that will increase net social wealth.3s ARM thus
stands to benefit both producers and consumers.
In particular, because it increases the value of expressive works,
ARM will put deflationary pressure on the price of accessing them.
In general, an asset's current price internalizes the value of its future
income stream.'39 Copyrights therefore commonly lose present value
because, with the passage of time and their wider distribution, they
prove increasingly vulnerable to uncompensated uses." Because it
reduces such risks, ARM tends to increase the value of copyrights.
But although this windfall might initially accrue to copyright owners,
competition among information providers would force access prices
downward, toward the marginal costs of obtaining and distributing
expressive works."4 Directly or indirectly, such price pressure would
similarly affect the prices that copyright owners can demand.' Gains
138. See generally Coase, supra note 124, at 15-16 (discussing the effect of reduced
transaction costs on the optimal distribution of resources).
139. See EDGAR K. BROWNING & JAQUELINE M. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 118-20 (1983) (discussing how to calculate the present value
of future income); DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 265-67 (1986) (same).
140. This reflects the general rule: as property rights to an asset grow more uncertain,
the discounted present value of the income stream derived from the asset decreases. See,
e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 139, at 271-72 (describing the effects of insecure property
rights on the market for oil). But see Lacey, supra note 133, at 1558 (arguing that
immortal copyrights in some works of fine art would continue to appreciate over time).
141. Current theories of microeconomics commonly predict such an equilibrium. See
PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 445-46 (11th ed. 1980); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (1981)
("Under perfect competition, price equals marginal cost, so if a firm's price is above its
marginal cost, the implication is that.., it has at least some market power.").
142. One might respond that, because copyrights constitute statutory monopolies,
copyright owners will price access above their marginal costs. This criticism confounds
two distinct uses of "monopoly," however. Regardless of how one characterizes their
statutory rights, copyright owners do not necessarily enjoy monopoly power in the market
for expressive works. See DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS,
UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 1C, at 1-7 (1992) ("Giving exclusive
rights to an author or inventor is no more a monopoly or anticompetitive than other
species of real or personal property."); Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense:
The Role of Antitrust Standards and First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289,
1299 (1991) ("The fact that copyright prevents ... works from being copied does not
mean that... authors and composers enjoy market power."). Substitutability across
copyrighted works presents would-be monopolists with frustratingly flat demand curves,
forcing access prices back down toward marginal costs. See William W. Fisher, III,
Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1702-03 (1988) ("The
degrees of market power enjoyed by different copyright holders ... vary considerably.");
Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. PITT. L. REV.
1119, 1128 (1986) (hypothesizing that courts disallow copyright misuse defenses because
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that ARM provides to copyright owners would thus pass on to
consumers in the form of reduced access fees.143
Because ARM will increase the value of copyrighted works,
moreover, it will encourage their greater production and improved
distribution.'" Consumers will thus benefit from better access to
information.'45 Access providers will improve the information itself,
too, increasing its quantity and making it better organized, verified,
interlinked, diverse, up-to-date, and relevant.'4 Although this
of "an appreciation that works of literature, art and music are highly substitutable and
that, in the usual case, copyright will not confer the degree of market power that the
patent-misuse cases presuppose"). Monopoly rents hardly pervade the market for
expressive works. Even if a few copyright owners enjoy monopoly rents, therefore, ARM
can still improve the efficiency of the market for expressive works so as, on balance, to
benefit the public.
Moreover, ARM increases the likelihood that copyright owners who really do have
monopoly power will exercise it in a manner that promotes the policy goals of fair use.
ARM will allow such copyright owners to accrue monopoly rents through price
discrimination rather than the relatively crude device of merely reducing supply. See
Netanel, supra note 22, at 293 n.30 ("Digital technology significantly enhances copyright
owner ability to engage in price discrimination."); Hardy, supra note 31, 91 18-21 (same);
see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 8, 178-79, 224 (describing how copyright owners
already price discriminate, advocating such practices, and predicting that technology will
improve them). This means that ARM will give monopolists a powerful incentive to
make their works widely available at a price that reflects each individual consumer's
willingness to pay. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in
Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233, 328 n.500 (1988) ("[P]rice discrimination by
copyright owners can improve the economic efficiency of copyright incentives without
decreasing that of dissemination and use .... "); see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) ("If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a
profit by charging a single price-that is, if it could not charge more to commercial users
than to the general public-... .all consumers would lose out-and so would the
commercial clients, who would have to pay more for the listings because ProCD could not
obtain any contribution toward costs from the consumer market."). Copyright law
appears to condone letting copyright owners enjoy at least some monopoly rents. See,
e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) ("[T]he
monopoly granted by copyright actively served its intended purpose of inducing the
creation of new material of potential historical value."). ARM helps to ensure that
copyright owners do not earn such rents at the expense of the substantive goals of the fair
use doctrine.
143. See NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 231 (noting that "the price of legitimate
copies of copyrighted works may be higher due to infringement losses suffered by
copyright owners"); Stefik, supra note 7, at 79 ("[I]nformation will most likely cost less
.... [T]hese savings could be passed on to consumers.").
144. See Ejan Mackaay, Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and
Innovation, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 867, 880 (1990); Stefik, supra note 7, at 78-79,
81.
145. "[U]nless the intellectual-property rights of publishers are respected and
enforced, many desirable items may never be made digitally available, free or at any
price." Stefik, supra note 7, at 81.
146. Consider, for example, how competition between Lexis and Westlaw has driven
rapid advances in user interfaces and data availability. Similar forces have led to well-
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cornucopia of information may at first come only for a fee, some of it
eventually will fall into the public domain. 47 To judge from current
implementations of ARM, copyright owners might very well offer
limited free access to their wares in an attempt to draw more
extensive (and expensive) uses."4 Entrepreneurs will undoubtedly
create other services, at present utterly and inevitably unforeseen, to
attract and satisfy consumers of information.
As such considerations demonstrate, "strict copyright
enforcement doesn't necessarily mean people would pay more for
viewing copyrighted material. 1 49  Because automated rights
management creates well-defined and readily transferable property
rights to information, it puts the power of the market in the service of
consumer demand. As Professor Goldstein explains, "there is no
better way for the public to indicate what they want than through the
price they are willing to pay in the marketplace. Uncompensated use
inevitably dilutes these signals.""" Fared use therefore probably will
provide better public access to copyrighted works in digital
intermedia than fair use does or could. At any rate, no one can
plausibly claim that fared use necessarily would serve the public
interest any less well than the existing quid pro quo.
4. Calculation and Experimentation
For lawmakers to calculate which intellectual property rights
best suit the new digital intermedia would require them to accurately
touted improvements to web search engines, such as AltaVista (available at
<http:/lwww.altavista.digital.com/>), Lycos (available at <http://www.lycos.com/>),
Yahoo! (available at <http://www.yahoo.com/>), and Excite (available at
<http://www.excite.com/>). See Steve G. Steinberg, Seek and Ye Shall Find (Maybe),
WIRED, May 1996, at 108 passim (discussing how competition between web search
engines drives innovation in search techniques).
147. But note that commentators have observed that some information will not fall
into the public domain easily or at all due to technological barriers, contracts established
under fared use, or tort doctrines like trade secret. See Ginsburg, supra note 118, at 61-65
(discussing possible impact of contractual limits on fair use); Kreiss, supra note 113, at 54-
56 (noting that the fair use doctrine does not excuse access that violates trade secret or
contract law); Samuelson, Technological Protection, supra note 14, at 28-30 (pondering
the demise of public domain works in online contexts).
148. Indeed, IBM's InfoMarket already operates on this basis. See InfoMarket (visited
Oct. 7,1997) <http://www.infomarket.ibm.com>.
149. Riddick, supra note 7, at 248; see also Ginsburg, supra note 118, at 65
("[Librarians may] fear that publishers will be sorely tempted to 'overcharge' for access
to and copying of their works, especially if there is no longer a fair use doctrine to hold
them in check. However, we do not now know whether... digital media will also enable
libraries to save money overall."); Okerson, supra note 85, at 83 (noting that "there can
be no marketplace without a ready supply of customers to buy new products").
150. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 217.
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measure several variables-many of them already intangible-that
rapid technological, social, and economic changes have sent
spinning.' At a minimum, choosing the proper quid pro quo for
copyright will prove difficult." It arguably defies solution entirely.
53
This difficulty by no means implies that we should forego
deliberating about how copyright law affects public policy. It does
imply, however, that we should not take it on faith that traditional
fair use doctrine represents the one best rule for regulating access to
expressive works in the digital intermedia. Regardless of our public
input and the sincerity of their deliberations, legislators simply do not
and cannot know that much.' 4
Automated rights management allows experimentation with a
wide variety of approaches to regulating access to expressive works in
digital intermedia. To the extent that ARM merely enforces existing
tenets of copyright law, on the one hand, it hardly can give rise to any
special objections. On the other hand, to the extent that ARM
supports particular agreements between copyright owners,
information providers, and consumers, its use merits a presumption
of enforceability. Absent proof of a very narrow category of
circumstances, such as duress or misrepresentation, we can assume
that contracts under fared use reflect the interests of those who
choose to enter into them.55 It seems highly doubtful that such
contracts would generate sufficient negative externalities to justify
their invalidation. 6 Whether a full-blown fared use system would
151. See Palmer, Patents and Copyrights, supra note 19, at 850.
152. See Mackaay, supra note 144, at 906 (describing questions about the optimality of
copyright's quid pro quo as "vacuous"); see also George Priest, What Economists Can Tell
Lawyers About Intellectual Property, in RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE
ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS, at 19, 21 (1985) ("[E]conomists know
almost nothing about the effect on social welfare of the patent system or of other systems
of intellectual property.").
153. See LUDWIG VON MISES, LIBERALISM IN THE CLASSICAL TRADITION 70-75 (3d
ed. 1985) (arguing that economic calculation cannot proceed absent price signals).
154. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER 77-78
(1948) (noting that the knowledge essential for central planning does not exist in
concentrated form).
155. See Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 318-
19 (1986).
156. See Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581, 596 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring) (noting that "contracts rarely defeat the function of a statute so utterly that
they may be set aside" under common law doctrines of public policy).
Professor Lemley has observed that "the compromises inherent in the copyright
statute reflect the accommodations of a number of different interests. Private parties who
'contract around' the compromises established by Congress affect the rights of third
parties .... " Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL.
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interfere with federal regulation of expressive information remains a
separate question, and receives consideration below.'5 If not killed at
birth by myopic legal conservatism, however, ARM will remove
decisions about which rights best suit the new digital intermedia from
lawmakers' hands and put them at the local level-the only place
where the requisite, relevant information exists.158
B. Objectionable Use Remains Fair Use
If ARM can give information providers the power to monitor
various uses and reuses of their copyrighted materials for billing
purposes,' 51 it can also give them the power to bar such uses as they
find objectionable. Technical prowess alone does not justify such
censorship, however. Public policy and copyright law pose additional
hurdles, and, as this Subpart shows, quite high ones. Whether an
information provider could overcome those hurdles by
supplementing copyright law with contract law remains a distinct
possibility, and one that Part IV considers separately.
The prospect of information providers using ARM to track and
prohibit objectionable uses of copyrighted works might well alarm
free speech advocates. It seems unlikely, however, that the First
Amendment's influence over state action would reach such private
action."' Thanks to the idea-expression distinction, moreover, courts
have found that they do not unconstitutionally hinder free speech in
using state power to enforce copyright claims against commentators.
As the Supreme Court has observed, the idea-expression distinction
"strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and
the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while
still protecting an author's expression."''
L. REV. 1239, 1278 (1995). All contracts "affect" third parties, however. Under common
law, only very few-such as contracts to kill-generate sufficient negative externalities to
merit invalidation.
157. See infra Part IV.B.3-4.
158. See infra Part IV.C.
159. See supra Part Il.A.
160. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374,
2383 (1996) ("[T]he First Amendment, the terms of which apply to governmental action,
ordinarily does not itself throw into constitutional doubt the decisions of private citizens
to permit, or to restrict, speech .... ).
161. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)
(emphasis added); see also Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he idea-expression line represents an acceptable
definitional balance between copyright and free speech interests."), quoted in Walt
Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1978); 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note
90, § 10.3, at 10:69 ("The idea-expression distinction is a central mechanism for protecting
an author's expression while subjecting his ideas to free use, including copying."
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Where the First Amendment proves impotent against ARM-
based censorship, however, civil disobedience might have a very real
impact. Because ARM's powers would at most reach only cut-and-
paste quotations, it would not limit criticism or reportage that merely
paraphrases a protected work.62 Nor, of course, could a copyright
owner count on ARM to catch reuses that, innocently or not, include
cut-and-paste quotes of works stolen ("liberated," some would say)
from ARM protection."s
It bears noting that the NIl White Paper and NIICPA would, if
written into law, considerably raise the stakes of "laundering" ARM-
protected documents.'" That escalation seems unwise, not to
mention at cross-purposes to existing law. As currently interpreted,
the fair use doctrine excuses some amount of unauthorized cut-and-
paste quoting from expressive works protected only by ARM (and
the owner's outcry). The NIl White Paper and NIICPA propose
banning devices that have "the purpose or effect" of circumventing
ARM technology." Because this provision would outlaw methods of
squeezing fair use out of ARM-protected works, it would penalize
the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Copyright Act.1"
For now, at least, fair use can trump a copyright owner's
objections. The American Geophysical court allowed licensing to
(footnotes omitted)).
Note, however, that courts have cited the fair use doctrine as well as the idea-
expression distinction when attempting to assuage concerns about freedom of speech.
See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 ("In view of the First Amendment protections
already embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression
and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment
traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair
use .... "). It thus remains an open question whether a court that declines to allow fair
use under the reasoning of American Geophysical and Princeton University Press would
nonetheless refuse to find infringement on First Amendment grounds. See Twin Peaks
Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1378 (9th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that
in an "extraordinary" case the First Amendment might supersede fair use).
162. More precisely, ARM would only detect cut-and-paste quotations; once a human
administrator has noted copyright violations through other means, such as the creation of
derivative works, ARM might come back into play.
163. See Stefik, supra note 7, at 80 (discussing limits of ARM technology); Weber,
supra note 7, at 11-12 (same).
164. See supra Part ll.B.2 (discussing proposal in Nil White Paper and NIICPA to add
§§ 1201-04 to the Copyright Act, effectively outlawing anti-ARM techniques regardless of
the legality of their intended uses).
165. See S. 1284, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995); H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995); NII
WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 230.
166. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 990-91; Okerson, supra note 85, at 84; Post,
Controlling Cybercopies, supra note 9, at 45; Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, supra note
14, at 191; Samuelson, Technological Protection, supra note 14, at 27, 33; see also supra
Part II.B.2 (discussing proposal to add §§ 1201-04 to the Copyright Act).
1998]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
limit the fair use defense only "when the means for paying for such a
use is made easier." '167 The court thus conditioned its holding on the
observation that "a particular unauthorized use should be considered
'more fair' when there is no ready market or means to pay for the
use."'1 6  In this, it followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.:
The market for potential derivative uses includes only those
that creators of original works would in general develop or
license others to develop. Yet the unlikelihood that
creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or
lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from
the very notion of a potential licensing market.169
Therefore, although information providers might like to stop wags
who evade ARM protection and reuse "liberated" works in
objectionable ways, the fair use defense would continue to shield
such defendants from copyright infringement claims.
One might well question the economic wisdom of such a policy.
Just because an information provider refuses to license a particular
use does not mean that no market exists. Rather, it demonstrates
that the information provider demands more for that use than
anyone wants to pay. Even a flat refusal to deal does not
demonstrate market failure. As Professor Gordon has observed, "[a]
refusal to license must not automatically justify a right to fair use;
markets can function only if owners have a right to say 'no' as well as
'yes.' ,..0 Strictly speaking, courts should thus find market failures
only when technical barriers-not mere refusals to deal-prevent
licensing agreements from taking place.
As the reasoning in the Campbell and American Geophysical
decisions on this point demonstrates, however, the fair use doctrine
sometimes favors public access over sound economics. Information
providers who would prefer to use ARM and copyright law to
completely bar objectionable reuses of their work will thus probably
find their efforts thwarted by anti-ARM techniques and the fair use
doctrine. Here, at least, fair use strikes back at ARM.
Suppose that you defused the ARM protecting a copyrighted
167. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994),
cert dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995).
168. Id.; see also Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d
1381, 1387 n.4 (quoting American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 931), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1336 (1997).
169. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,592 (1994).
170. Gordon, supra note 114, at 1634 (citation omitted).
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expression and reused the work without the owner's authorization.
Often such an owner, offended, will disdain to charge you a licensing
fee."' But some owners will, if able, take your coin (and your
apology).' Can you count on the fair use defense to excuse not only
your objectionable reuse of a copyrighted work but also your refusal
to pay for that use? Probably so. Reuses that qualify for the fair use
defense do not, under § 107 of the Copyright Act, constitute
infringement." The Act would thus not obligate you to pay.74
Requiring payment in such circumstances arguably makes more
sense, for the same reasons that support the spread of licensing
generally."5 Furthermore, excusing non-payment might encourage
over-production of reuses that aim, for purely economic reasons, to
offend copyright owners."6 True, parody and other criticism "can
provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in
the process, creating a new one."'' But too much of a good thing is
no good at all.
Such theoretical considerations have yet to change copyright
law, however. Unless and until they do, it looks as if information
providers will have to suffer objectionable uses without
remuneration,7 license them grudgingly,'79 or try to prevent them by
171. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572 (describing how plaintiff refused defendants' offer
of payment for right to parody its copyrighted work).
172. See, e.g., infra Part III.C.1 (discussing how and why the litigants in Campbell
finally settled their dispute).
173. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes
such as criticism, comment .... scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright.").
174. See Ginsburg, supra note 118, at 64 ("Today, the effect of declaring a use 'fair' is
to make it free of charge.").
175. See infra Part IH.A.
176. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 599 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("We should not make it
easy for musicians to exploit existing works and then later claim that their rendition was a
valuable commentary on the original.").
177. Id. at 579.
178. Certainly, copyright owners would sometimes refuse or refund licensing fees in
order to express disdain for the uses to which their material has been put. The flat claim
of the Court that "the law recognizes no derivative market for critical works," i& at 592,
raises a question whether copyright owners can demand payment for objectionable uses
formerly excused by fair use. Surely, though, the Court's language reflects an assumption
about the difficulties of negotiating licenses under hostile conditions-an assumption that
ARM's coolly automated functions could very well invalidate.
179. At what price could copyright owners license objectionable uses?- Writing prior
to American Geophysical and Princeton University Press, Professor Ginsburg suggested
that courts might in general discount fees for licenses newly extended to digital media.
See Ginsburg, supra note 118, at 64. Professor Ginsburg noted that:
Perhaps in a digital world, fair use would not be an all-or-nothing matter; a court
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means of supplementary contracts.'O
C. The Advent of Fared Use
Considered together, the ARM technology described in Subpart
A likely will combine with the legal doctrines described in Subpart B
to place digital intermedia under a system of reciprocal quasi-
compulsory licenses. This spontaneously generated outcome would
represent the default rule under fared use. For reasons that this
section explains, fared use offers a welcome alternative to the
dystopia portrayed by those who would have fair use function in
digital intermedia exactly as it has in conventional media. Section 1
explores the scope of fared use's reciprocal quasi-compulsory license.
Section 2 describes the benefits of a fared use system and defends it
against possible objections.
1. The Reciprocal Quasi-Compulsory License
The technical and legal factors set forth above likely will
combine in digital intermedia to supplant fair use with an analogous
but distinctly different rule: fared use. In a nutshell, fared use would
subject copyrighted material in digital intermedia to a reciprocal
quasi-compulsory license.'
The impact of ARM on licensing transaction costs, together with
the theory of fair use embraced by American Geophysical, Princeton
University Press, and the NII White Paper, ensures that consumers in
most instances will have to pay for using copyrighted material in
digital intermedia. Consumers thus face increased licensing. At the
same time, the reasoning of Campbell and its progeny, American
might uphold the copying at issue, but require the copyist to pay for it. The price
the user would pay would be less than the price the information-provider would
have charged. In effect, a compulsory license regime might split the difference
between user claims to free access and publisher initiatives to charge for all uses.
Id
Consistent with the market failure view of fair use, however, the courts in American
Geophysical and Princeton University Press did not demand that copyright owners
discount their wares just because they used new and better licensing techniques. That a
copyright owner licenses a use grudgingly should not change the result. To the contrary, a
use that offends the copyright owner, thus imposing non-monetary as well as monetary
costs, presents an even better case for full remuneration.
180. See infra Part IV.A (discussing such contractual techniques); infra Part IV.B
(discussing enforceability of resultant contracts).
181. The use of the prefix "quasi" serves to distinguish this type of license, compulsory
only in the sense of its virtual inevitability, from the conventional type of compulsory
licenses, imposed by statute and committed to imposing uniform rates. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.
§§ 111(c), 115,118(c)(3) (1994).
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Geophysical and Princeton University Press, ensures that copyright
owners cannot selectively bar what they regard as objectionable uses
of their material. Copyright owners must therefore endure increased
licensing, too. In sum, fared use establishes, at least in its default
mode, a reciprocal quasi-compulsory license.
This license has limits, however. For one thing, it does not
require a copyright owner to put up with as much objectionable use
as consumers choose to purchase or take. Rather, consumers have a
right to only as much access as fair use would traditionally provide.
Beyond this, a copyright owner presumably could shut off access by
declining to license further. To borrow the example from Campbell,
a parodist would have the right to a guitar riff, but not a whole
song. " ' Fair use therefore would continue to guarantee access, albeit
limited, to expressive works in digital intermedia.
Another example from Campbell demonstrates that copyright
owners will face powerful incentives to offer licenses even for uses
that qualify as fair. To settle the Campbell litigation, the copyright
owner, Acuff-Rose Music, agreed to accept license fees from the
defendant parodist, 2 Live Crew.1' Acuff-Rose did so, moreover,
despite the fact that it earlier had disdained 2 Live Crew's offer to
pay licensing fees." A representative for Acuff-Rose succinctly
explained the motivation for this change of heart: "'[W]e will be
getting paid for the song.' " The settlement benefited 2 Live Crew
as well, giving it a safe harbor more clearly defined than the Supreme
Court's necessarily theoretical opinion could provide.
This outcome suggests that fared use will introduce licensing not
only where, thanks to ARM, "the means for paying for such a use is
made easier,'. but even where "the unlikelihood that creators of
imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their
own productions"' ' might otherwise give rise to the fair use defense.
Consumers would, of course, retain the right to refuse to pay for uses
182. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588-89.
183. See Nashville: Acuff-Rose, Rappers Settle Copyright Suit, NASHVILLE BANNER,
June 5, 1996, at B2 ("Acuff-Rose said it dismissed its lawsuit against the group while 2
Live Crew agreed to license the sale of their version of the Roy Orbison classic.").
184. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572 ("2 Live Crew's manager informed Acuff-Rose that
2 Live Crew had written a parody of 'Oh, Pretty Woman,'... and that they were willing
to pay a fee for the use they wished to make of it.... Acuff-Rose's agent refused
permission .... ).
185. Nashville: Acuff-Rose, Rappers Settle Copyright Suit, supra note 183, at B2.
186. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994),
cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995).
187. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
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that qualify as fair."' But they will no doubt find the prospect of
clarifying their rights appealing, and payment via ARM not at all
burdensome. In similar fashion, the prospect of increased revenue
and of escaping the uncertainty of fair use may very well encourage
copyright owners simply to license all uses of their works."8 9
Given the continuing high transaction costs of determining the
proper boundaries of fair use, one might argue for requiring that
those who benefit from copyright protection in the digital intermedia
license all uses. Implementing that proposal almost certainly would
require new legislation, however, such as that which already requires
the compulsory licensing of non-dramatic musical works and the
like. The prospect of Congress dictating the price and availability
of every copyrighted bit surging through the digital intermedia does
not, to say the least, give much comfort.19" ' On this point, even the
otherwise activist NII White Paper counsels a hands-off approach."
The sanest response to fair use's lingering influence, therefore, would
tolerate its remaining (if reduced) transaction costs, let courts
continue shaping common law solutions, and give information
providers and consumers freedom to polish rough spots with
contractual devices. 93
188. Thus, lawmakers should reject the proposal of NIl White Paper and NIICPA to
add §§ 1201-04 to the Copyright Act, effectively outlawing anti-ARM techniques
regardless of the legality of their intended uses. See supra Part II.B.2.
189. See infra Part IV.A.1-2 (discussing incentives influencing anti-criticism and anti-
censorship contracts).
190. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994); see also id, § 114(0 (providing the scope of exclusive
rights in a sound recording); id. § 116 (providing for negotiated licenses for public
performances by means of coin operated phonorecord players); id. § 118 (providing the
scope of exclusive rights for use of certain works in connection with non-commercial
broadcasting); id, § 119(c)(2)-(3) (providing that fees will be discerned by voluntary
negotiation or compulsory arbitration).
191. To date, legislation relating to the Internet has evinced sadly meager wisdom.
See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849 (E.D. Pa.) (enjoining enforcement of several
sections of 47 U.S.C. § 223 on grounds of unconstitutionality), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997).
192. The NII White Paper criticizes flat-rate compulsory licensing because such
licensing treats "all works alike, even though their value in a competitive marketplace
would likely vary dramatically. It also treats all users alike. It alters the free market
relationship between buyers and sellers." NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 52; see also
Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and Digital Content: Notes on a Scorecard,
CYBERSPACE LAW. 15, 21 (1996) ("Congress should stay away from compulsory licensing
for new [digital] media, at least at first.").
193. But see Netanel, supra note 22, at 335 n.248 (praising German-style "industry-
wide bargaining under the threat of administrative determination of binding 'reasonable'
license fee[s]"); id. at 381 (proposing that by imposing liability rules a "democratic
paradigm would in effect force content owners to bargain under the shadow of a
compulsory license"). Even though Professor Netanel appears to have decided on this
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To gauge from Campbell, American Geophysical, and Princeton
University Press, defeating the fair use defense requires only that an
information provider guarantee that consumers can license
copyrighted works at some price-not at any particular price. Future
courts might apply this doctrine to find that exorbitant licensing fees,
or price discrimination designed to deter objectionable uses, shows
the lack of "a ready market or means to pay for the use."'14 Perhaps
courts also will review licensing practices for reasonableness. 95
Courts should, at any rate, enforce valid contracts between
information providers and consumers.19 Settling the pricing issue will
have to wait until fared use enters actual practice and, inevitably,
litigation.
policy for wholly theoretical reasons, he could also have drawn support from the case law
discussed supra in Part II.B.1. Those cases support common law and contractual
responses, too, though, and Netanel's preferred, statutory strategy entails a high risk of
public choice effects and regulatory capture.
194. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994),
cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995); see also Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan
Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 n.4 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting American
Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 931), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997). Wise courts will
distinguish between the two cases.
195. Cf. United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers (In re
Turner), 782 F. Supp. 778,778-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (involving cable television challenge to
Ascap licensing practices based on antitrust decree regulating Ascap), affd, 956 F.2d 21
(2d Cir. 1994); Conference on Fair Use, CONFU Draft on Fair Use Guidelines, Proposal
for Educational Fair Use Guidelines for Digital Images § 2.1, reprinted in 53 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 125, 126-27 (Dec. 19, 1996) ("Images that are readily
available in usable digital form for purchase or license at a fair price should not be
digitized for addition to an institutional image collection without permission."); Stefik,
supra note 7, at 81.
More specifically, perhaps courts would review fared use licensing practices under
antitrust law's rule of reason standard. See HENRY H. PERRIIT, JR., LAW AND THE
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 457 (1996) ("Contractual restrictions on redissemination
are covenants not to compete, and they should be scrutinized under the same standards
used for traditional covenants not to compete."). Analogously, courts might scrutinize
fared use licenses for "copyright misuse." See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911
F.2d 970, 977-79 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that a license's anti-competitive provisions gave
rise to copyright misuse defense to infringement). However, the copyright misuse
doctrine remains highly controversial. See David M. Maiorana, Comment, Privileged Use:
Has Judge Boudin Suggested a Viable Means of Copyright Protection for the Non-Literal
Aspects of Computer Software in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International?, 46
AM. U. L. REV. 149, 157-82 (1996) (reviewing cases and commentary relating to
computer software copyrights). At any rate, regardless of how well such analyses apply to
licenses between information providers, it seems unlikely that licenses between
information providers and consumers would raise the same questions.
196. See infra Part IV.A-B (discussing likely form and enforceability of such
contracts).
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2. The Net Benefits of Fared Use
Compared to fair use, the fared use system described here would
offer a number of advantages. The discussion above explained the
power of fared use to lower transaction costs radically, and the
manifold advantages of such savings. ' Another consequence of
streamlining licensing procedures merits note: it encourages public
discourse by providing a safe harbor for the reuse of copyrighted
material. Critics, satirists, and parodists can thus rely on fared use to
immunize them from the infringement claims of irate copyright
owners seeking injunctive relief.'98
Such irate copyright owners hardly would have grounds to
complain, however, that fared use treats them roughly. In other
times and in other media, the fair use doctrine would have put them
at risk of suffering objectionable uses of their copyrighted material
and of losing licensing fees. Fared use blunts at least one side of that
double-edged sword. It does so, moreover, without undue cost to the
public. The licensing arrangements allowed by ARM would, after all,
merely ask that those who engage in objectionable uses pay for
enjoying a supply of victims.
Methodologically speaking, fared use offers the considerable
advantage of relying solely on existing legal doctrines. It thus
requires only technical innovation-not legislative or judicial
innovation-to give it effect. Of course, in practice it may turn out
that fared use has some unforeseen and unpleasant consequences.
Legal tinkering might cure these. More likely, however, private
parties will contract around any untoward effects caused by fared use
and once more render judicial and legislative invention unnecessary.
The next Part addresses how such contracts might affect the default
rules of a fared use regime.
IV. CONTRACTUAL MODIFICATIONS OF FARED USE
Copyright owners and consumers probably will want to contract
around the spontaneously generated default version of fared use
described above. On the one hand, copyright owners will want to bar
197. See supra Part III.A.
198. For an example of how a plaintiff can use copyright law to bar an offending
parody, see Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1978)
(affirming injunction of "a rather bawdy depiction of the Disney characters as active
members of a free thinking, promiscuous, drug ingesting counterculture"). See also
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188-89
(5th Cir. 1979) (affirming injunction on poster of bare-chested former Dallas Cowboys
cheerleaders).
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objectionable reuses of the works that they place in digital
intermedia. Many consumers would, for the right price, agree to such
anti-criticism contracts. On the other hand, some consumers will
want, and probably get, blanket licenses to engage in any reuses of
protected works, however offensive. This Part considers the
likelihood and desirability of such contractual modifications to fared
use.
Subpart A considers the utility of two broad classes of contracts
modifying fared use: anti-criticism contracts and anti-censorship
contracts. It predicts that only a few especially thin-skinned
copyright owners will forego licensing fees in favor of anti-criticism
contracts. In contrast, the popularity of anti-censorship contracts
remains in doubt. Because anti-censorship contracts raise few red
flags, Subpart B focuses its enforceability analysis on anti-criticism
contracts. Notwithstanding the risk of preemption that this analysis
of anti-criticism contracts uncovers, Subpart C argues that we should
invite experimentation with this and other ways of structuring rights
to information. Subpart C thus suggests, as a compromise, an exit
strategy: enforce otherwise preempted contracts on condition that
either party permanently forsake appeal to copyright law with regard
to the subject matter of the contract.
A. The Utility of Fared Use Contracts
Information providers and consumers undoubtedly will want to
modify fared use's default rule through a variety of contractual
devices. Although the details of such contracts necessarily remain
beyond our ken at present, two broad types seem likely: anti-
criticism contracts and anti-censorship contracts. This Subpart
considers the utility of each in turn. Section 1 argues that most
copyright owners, on careful analysis, will find trying to prevent
objectionable uses too expensive and futile to justify the effort. They
will thus hew fairly closely to the default version of fared use
described above.199 Section 2 finds anti-censorship contracts an
attractive option, but one most likely limited to narrow markets.
1. Anti-Criticism Contracts
In most cases, a contract that modifies fared use's default rules
to allow a copyright owner to bar offensive uses simply will not be
cost-effective. The problem, in brief: an anti-criticism contract fails
to provide the licensor with any greater monetary benefit than
199. See supra Part III.C.1.
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unconstrained licensing would provide, and may provide
considerably less. Therefore, only a copyright owner with an
overriding non-monetary objective, such as a powerful aversion to
public criticism, will find anti-criticism contracts worthwhile.
Recall, for example, the Church of Technolism scenario
introduced earlier in this Article.' By its close, the licensee (you)
had violated a contract that gave the licensor (the Church) the right
to bar offensive uses of its copyrighted material-even uses that
would otherwise fall within the scope of the fair use defense. The
Church cannot hope to make money by suing you for breach of
contract. Tolerating your offensive use, pocketing the license fee,
and avoiding the costs of litigation would prove much more cost-
effective? 1 Rather, the Church will bother suing you only if it favors
non-monetary goals, such as getting an injunction to end your
sacrilegious quotations.'
Churches often have very powerful non-monetary goals, of
course. But that marks them as unique. Most other copyright
owners put finance before honor.' If that sounds crass, keep in mind
that anti-criticism contracts will not come cheaply. Licensors who
want injunctive relief against offensive uses will not only have to
forego licensing fees for such uses and (almost certainly) bear
litigation costs; they will also have to offer consumers something
extra to make such censorious contracts attractive in the first
instance. That something extra probably will take the form of lower
200. See supra Part II.C.
201. Perhaps things would work out differently if courts would enforce liquidated
damages clauses that do more than cover mere losses, but as a rule, courts do not. See,
e.g., U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105, 118-19 (1907); DJ Manufacturing Corp. v.
U.S., 86 F.3d 1130, 1133-35 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981) ("A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.").
202. The Church may also have to show that mere money will not suffice. Generally
speaking, in contract suits, "before granting a decree for specific performance, the court
must make a finding that the plaintiff cannot obtain full and complete justice by a
judgment for money damages." 5A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1136
(1964 & Supp. 1996); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981)
("Specific performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be
adequate to protect the expectation interest of the injured party."). It bears noting,
however, that advanced ARM could give the Church a self-help remedy by allowing it to
automatically withdraw quotes lifted from protected documents.
203. Consider that the court in Princeton University Press reported only one instance
of a publisher refusing to license copies: where "[t]he excerpt was so large that the
publisher would have preferred that students buy the book itself." Princeton Univ. Press
v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1388 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1336 (1997); see also supra Part III.C.1 (discussing how and why the litigants in
Campbell finally settled their dispute).
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licensing fees for acceptable uses of copyrighted material. In sum,
copyright owners so thin-skinned as to demand and enforce anti-
criticism contracts had better have fairly thick wallets.
2. Anti-Censorship Contracts
In contrast to anti-criticism contracts, anti-censorship contracts
would modify fared use's default rule, the reciprocal quasi-
compulsory license, to commit copyright owners to allowing criticism,
satire, and other potentially offensive uses. Such access contracts
would obviously appeal to reporters, reviewers, academics, and
others who regularly engage in biting commentary. With fared use or
without, commentators would have to pay licensing fees for what
they borrow in excess of fair use's limits. Anti-censorship contracts
would guarantee, however, that everyone who pays such fees under
fared use would enjoy free access to and reuse of the works that they
quote and critique.
The size of the market for censorship-free access remains
uncertain. Some copyright owners might demand a steep premium
for giving up the right to license their works as they see fit. On the
other hand, some copyright owners might charge less for such
contracts. What Landes and Posner observe of book reviews may
well hold true in general: "Ex ante, publishers are better off if
reviewers are free to quote without permission; it makes reviews a
credible form of book advertising."'  Publishers might even come to
advertise their anti-censorship agreements as proof of confidence
and, thus, credibility. Still other publishers-both amateurs and
start-ups employing something like Netscape's marketing strategy-
would probably offer censorship-free access at no charge. Some
might even pay consumers for their attention.'
204. Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 359.
205. This suggests that consumers provide valuable inputs that, when combined with
others' copyrighted expressions, create independently valuable outputs. Audience
attention, in other words, constitutes not mere consumption but rather an additional, vital
step in an ongoing production process. See generally Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value,
WIRED, July 1995, at 136, 14041 (offering new viewpoint for compensating intellectual
effort in the Internet-based economy). We should thus perhaps reconsider whether
copyright should expand as far as transaction costs will allow. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 21, at 178-79, 229, 236 (posing this question); Landes & Posner, supra note 58,
at 354 (same).
Giving copyright owners the state-backed right to appropriate from consumers the
use-value of their mental assets raises grave distributional concerns. See generally
Palmer, Patents and Copyrights, supra note 19, at 855-65 (arguing that copyright
enforcement violates the property right that each has in his or her person); Palmer,
Intellectual Property, supra note 19, at 278-87 (making an economic argument toward a
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Here, as elsewhere, the acts of freely contracting parties defy
prediction. Regardless of the price and popularity of anti-censorship
contracts, however, they at least avoid the questions of enforceability
that dog anti-criticism contracts. The next Subpart takes up that
question.
B. The Enforceability of Fared Use Contracts
Unless Congress or courts forbid them, contracts will
undoubtedly change the shape of fared use.2" At least some
copyright owners will want to limit the use of their works in contexts
that they regard as critical, blasphemous, satirical, violative of their
secrecy, or otherwise offensive.207 Mere licensing fees will not satisfy
such thin-skinned copyright owners, who would happily forego
monetary gain for the right to bar offensive uses of their proprietary
information.'3  ARM can technically empower them to police
contracts reserving their anti-criticism rights. But can copyright
similar conclusion). Even apart from such equitable concerns, however, economic
efficiency demands that we assign property rights so as to reduce transaction costs. Only
this path, the argument goes, will carry us closer to that Coasian ideal: a transaction-cost-
free world. Assignations of property rights do not fare equally in this task. Copyrights,
being intangible, fare particularly badly when compared to the tangible property rights in
persons, copies, and distribution channels.
The sharp boundaries of tangible property make transacting in it relatively cheap.
ARM technology will allow us to leverage each of our tangible property rights into
technically and legally enforceable contracts that govern the exchange of information.
Finally, consumers will have the power to internalize the externalities generated by their
perception and remembrance of others' expressive works. Authors, on the other hand,
will find that they can recoup their marginal costs without recourse to a statutory
monopoly. This system of fared use, based in tangible property and express contract,
could offer considerably lower transaction costs than the existing system of copyright law.
Economic efficiency may thus someday demand that we abandon copyright as a
temporary kludge, once useful but now outmoded.
206. Professor Goldstein recognizes the likelihood of such contracts and mentions an
interesting alternative to forbidding them: "If copyright owners try to
circumvent.., copyright exemptions by contract-and there is every reason to expect
that they will-Congress will have to reconsider the distributional aspects of its copyright
agenda and decide whether to outlaw such contracts or to grant direct cash subsidies."
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 224-55.
207. Copyright owners have issued such demands in the past, in other media. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994) (involving infringement suit
arising out of use of copyrighted music in parody); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-
Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir. 1980) (involving infringement suit
arising out of the use of a competitor's magazine cover in a comparative advertisement);
Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 958
(D.N.H. 1978) (involving infringement suit arising out of a politician's use of an
opponent's copyrighted material).
208. For an economic analysis of copyright owners' motives to prevent criticism of
their works, see Gordon, supra note 114, at 1632-35.
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owners count on courts to enforce such contracts?E9 The following
sections consider objections to such agreements based in shrinkwrap
licenses, adhesion contracts, § 301 preemption, and Supremacy
Clause preemption. Only the last of these appears to have much
bite."' The following Subpart, C, will suggest a way for mutually
consenting parties to save their otherwise preempted agreements by
exiting from copyright into contract law.
1. Fared Use Contracts as Shrinkwrap Licenses
Any contract that attempts to alter the default rules for using
copyrighted works in an automated rights management system will
probably resemble the types of agreements that already mediate
access to digital intermedia.21 ' A contract shaping ARM rights will, in
other words, require a consumer to consent to its terms before it
grants access to the protected works. Indeed, existing ARM systems
already employ contracts conforming to this model.
Commentators have suggested that this type of agreement may
qualify as a shrinkwrap license.2 3 Insofar as that equation would
render ARM invalid per se, however, it errs. Consumers can
apprehend the terms of an ARM contract at the point of sale, prior to
committing to purchase the information in question.214 The lack of
209. The NII White Paper would have courts do so: "The Working Group believes
that, regardless of the type of transaction, where parties wish to contract electronically,
they should be able to form a valid contract on-line." NIl WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at
58.
210. Note that this analysis largely ignores the enforceability of anti-censorship
contracts, which modify fared use to provide consumers with a blanket license to engage
in any paid use. Whatever the plausibility (uncertain) and appeal (considerable) of such
agreements, they simply do not run the same risks of unenforceability that dog the anti-
criticism agreements at issue here.
211. See, e.g., General Terms and Conditions for Use of the Lexis-Nexis Service, Apr. 1,
1996, LEXIS, TERMS Library, GENRL File.
212. See, e.g., Registered User Agreement for IBM InfoMarket Service, supra note 97.
213. Shrinkwrap licenses "purport to condition the purchaser's right to use the
program on acceptance of the license and explicitly indicate that opening the software
package or loading the program into a computer constitutes acceptance." RAYMOND T.
NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, 7.24[1][b], at 7-87 (2d ed. 1992 & 2d
Supp. 1995); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright
Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1920 (1990) (questioning
protective worth of "shrinkwrap license" equivalent for CD-ROM absent a validating
state statute); Paul T. Sheils & Robert Penchina, What's All the Fuss About Feist? The
Sky Is Not Falling on the Intellectual Property Rights of Online Database Proprietors, 17
DAYTON L. REv. 563, 573 (1992) (" '[B]ound-by-use' license agreements are (albeit with
some very important differences) the online database equivalent of 'shrinkwrap licenses'
that accompany mass-marketed computer software programs.").
214. See supra Part II.A.
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this degree of notice has proved fatal to shrinkwrap licenses in some
cases. 5 In other cases, giving consumers prior notice has saved
"sbrinkwrap" licenses-better called "access contracts"216-from
invalidation.217
Still other factors widen the margin of safety for ARM access
contracts that, rightly or wrongly, get equated to "shrinkwrap"
licenses. The Seventh Circuit recently enforced a shrinkwrap license
despite its reliance on terms disclosed after purchase, 2  and the
forthcoming Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code almost
certainly will guarantee the enforceability of a wide class of
"shrinkwrap" licenses.219 Point-of-sale contracts offered to consumers
via automated rights management thus appear likely to escape the
risk of invalidation that, according to some authorities, shrinkwrap
licenses should face.2
215. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 108 (3d Cir. 1991);
Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759,766 (D. Ariz. 1993). But
see ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding
enforceability of terms imposed after sale on grounds that "[n]otice on the outside [of the
box of software], terms on the inside, and a right to return the software for a refund if the
terms are unacceptable (a right that the license expressly extends), may be a means of
doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike").
216. See U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(1) (Discussion Draft Apr. 14, 1997) (" 'Access contract'
means a contract for electronic access to a resource containing information, resource for
processing information, data system, or other similar facility of a licensor, licensee, or
third party.").
217. See Microstar v. Formgen, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 1312, 1317-18 (S.D. Cal. 1996)
(holding that where the opening screen refers to a separate LICENSE.DOC that
conditions use of plaintiff's software, and defendant reads the license, defendant cannot
claim the license is invalid on grounds of waiver or abandonment); Arizona Retail Sys.,
831 F. Supp. at 763 (holding that where plaintiff ordered an evaluation diskette, but
received and opened a live diskette, "the contract was not formed when TSL shipped the
goods, but rather only after ARS opened the shrinkwrap on the live version of PC-MOS
which ARS had notice would result in a contract being formed").
218. See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1455.
219. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2B-112(d) (Discussion Draft Apr. 14, 1997) ("Manifestation of
assent may be proved in any manner, including by a showing that a procedure existed by
which a party must of necessity have engaged in conduct that manifests assent to the
contract or the term in order to proceed further in the use it made of the information.");
see also id. § 2B-202(a) ("A contract may be made in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including by the conduct of both parties .... ).
220. But cf. Karjala, supra note 86 passim (regarding shrinkwrap licenses as suspect on
preemption grounds). Professor Karjala notes:
Shrinkwrap licenses purport to bind a purchaser to terms to which he or she did
not specifically assent, but such assent can easily be made a condition of access
in the Internet environment. We must be cautious in accepting these kinds of
distinctions, however, because the end result is the same as in the case of the
enforceable shrinkwrap license, namely, the transformation of copyright into a
pure owners' rights statute.
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2. Fared Use Contracts as Adhesion Contracts
Despite its rhetorical sting, the "adhesion contract" label carries
surprisingly little legal weight. As one commentator has noted, "[t]he
law currently governing contracts of adhesion is a jumble of different
lines of analysis, contradictory outcomes, and convoluted
expressions."'2 1 For the most part, courts remain unmoved by
adhesion contract claims. Absent extraordinary circumstancest m
courts traditionally enforce all duly signed contracts unless the
drafting party affirmatively misleads the signing party.'m It thus does
not seem likely that the contracts giving rise to fared use routinely
will suffer invalidation on grounds of adhesion.'
That fared use survives this test should please even those who
would have courts take more aggressive steps against adhesion
contracts. Fared use does not exist in a vacuum. One can evaluate its
merits only by considering the alternative: copyright law's fair use
doctrine. Insofar as that doctrine represents a "bargain" between
copyright owners and the public-a popular fiction---it epitomizes
the type of take-it-or-leave-it offer that foes of adhesion contracts so
dislike.' Neither authors nor their audiences have much real say in
Id. at 532.
221. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion. An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1174,1197 (1983).
222. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1987) (allowing courts to refuse to enforce unconscionable
contracts in whole or in part); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979)
(same); see also, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (refusing to enforce installment contract that entitles the seller to repossess
goods no matter how small the unpaid balance). As Posner notes, however, the contract
at issue in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. merited invalidation, at any rate, on
grounds that it penalized the buyer by withholding all shares of the proceeds. See
POSNER, supra note 107, at 103 n.3.
223. See Rakoff, supra note 221, at 1184-85. Judge Posner supports such a narrow
view of adhesion contracts. "Economic analysis reveals no grounds other than fraud,
incapacity, and duress (the last narrowly defined) for allowing a party to repudiate the
bargain that he made in entering into the contract." POSNER, supra note 107, at 104.
224. See NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 58-59 ("Moreover, state validating
statutes-similar to those used to validate shrink wrap licenses--can be used for on-line
licenses to help overcome concerns regarding adhesion .....
225. See supra Part III.A.3.
226. Indeed, one seminal analysis of adhesion contracts criticized them on grounds
that they too greatly resembled legislation. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REV. 629, 630
(1943) (describing adhesion contracts as "private legislation"). The "private legislation"
metaphor tends to mislead, however, because it over-emphasizes citizens' power to shape
statist legislation, underestimates the power of consumers to choose between and thus
shape contracts, and ignores the fact that so-called "private legislation" does not
fundamentally rely on coercive state power. See Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom
of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1359 (1982) (arguing that
1998]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
how Congress distributes rights to expressive works.' It hardly
answers this objection to observe that parties can bargain away from
fair use to agree to alternative allocations of rights-not, at least, so
long as lawmakers stand ready to preempt certain of those
agreements. Nor does it do much to observe that special interests
can-and indeed do-successfully lobby Congress for favorable
treatment under the Copyright Act.' For "although the political
process itself involves bargaining, government typically offers
benefits to individual beneficiaries on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. '
Fared use ameliorates the adhesive aspects of this political
bargain by empowering mutually consenting parties to experiment
with alternative ways of allocating their rights to information. Given
the likelihood that fared use will force information providers to
compete for consumers by offering them attractive terms of access,
and that decreasing communication costs will encourage consumer
coordination and self-help, we should not assume that fared use will
decrease consumers' bargaining power.m  Ultimately, however,
bargaining power has little to do with the question at hand. As Judge
Posner has observed of adhesion contracts, "[t]he problem is
monopoly, not bargaining power.' ' 2s Insofar as fared use weakens
the State's monopoly on specifying the terms by which consumers
access expressive works, therefore, it addresses the very concerns at
the heart of the adhesion contract doctrine.
3. Preemption by § 301
Both § 301 of the Copyright- Act 2 and the Constitution's
contrary to "private legislation" arguments, "freedom of contract and private
property... define domains in which individuals may establish both the means and the
ends for themselves, to pursue as they see fit (so long as they do not infringe upon the
rights of third parties)," and that "[p]rivate property is an institution that fosters
individualized, if not eccentric, preferences; it does not stamp them out").
227. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
("As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the
task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to
inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product." (emphasis
added)).
228. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 1001 ("[NIICPA] would vest copyright owners with
absolute authority to define the scope of the digital rights management regime .... It is
difficult to imagine a more blatant example of single-interest group legislation.").
229. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1452
(1989).
230. See supra Part III.A.3.
231. POSNER, supra note 107, at 102.
232. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
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Supremacy Clause m threaten to preempt the types of agreements
that would regulate access to information under fared use. Because
§ 301 typically fails to interfere with contractual obligations, however,
it poses little risk of preempting fared use contracts.
Through § 301, the Copyright Act preempts common law
doctrines or state statutes that might otherwise conflict with its
provisions. Section 301 specifies that the Copyright Act alone will
govern "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights" set forth in § 106 of the Act.' This terse delineation
of the Copyright Act's exclusive domain leaves a good deal
uncertain,2m a problem that reference to the legislative history of
§ 301 fails to alleviate. 6
Under the consensus view, however, contractual rights do not
qualify as "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright"' 7 because enforcing contractual rights calls for
proof of an additional legal element: the existence of a contractual
obligation.m As the Seventh Circuit recently explained,
[c]opyright law forbids duplication, public performance, and
so on, unless the person wishing to copy or perform the
work gets permission .... A copyright is a right against the
world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their
parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not
233. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
234. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). The Act also specifies that only "works of authorship that are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright
as specified by sections 102 and 103" will suffer preemption, id., but the works protected
by fared use will ex hypothesis satisfy those criteria.
235. See Hardy, supra note 31, 34 (reviewing case law and concluding "preemption
and contract doctrine are far from being comfortably settled").
236. See Carole P. Sadler, Comment, Federal Copyright Protection and State Trade
Secret Protection. The Case for Partial Preemption, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 667, 674 (1984)
("Rather than clarifying what state causes of action survive copyright preemption, the
legislative history of section 301 compounds the confusion.").
237. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
238. See 3 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 90, § 15.2.1.2, at 15:11 ("Contract law is a good
example of a state law that will be immune from preemption under the extra element
test."); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 1.01[B][1][a], at 1-19 (concluding that
"contract-based rights themselves are typically not subject to preemption" (footnotes
omitted)); Ginsburg, supra note 118, at 62 ("[S]ubstantial authority supports the
proposition that rights under contract are not equivalent to rights under copyright."). But
see David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption
of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 543,
614 (1992) ("The far-reaching public policy Section 301 implements clearly requires
preemption of contract-based protection of expression as expression where the effect is to
secure rights in that expression which are greater than, equal to, or supplemental of those
which Section 106 secures.").
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create "exclusive rights." 9
It thus seems highly unlikely that § 301 would preempt a contract that
authorizes information providers to forbid those who obtain
information under the contract from putting it to offensive uses.2
4. Preemption by the Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause states that the "Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof
... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."24' It of course provides
the legal foundation for § 301, which Congress enacted merely to
clarify and reaffirm preemption principles originally developed under
the Supremacy Clause.42 Perhaps the broader wording and intent of
the Supremacy Clause allows it to preempt fared use contracts that
the more specific provisions of § 301 would leave untouched.243 A
paucity of relevant case law'4 and the subtleties inherent to
239. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996); see also National
Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir. 1993)
("The contractual restriction on use of the programs constitutes an extra element that
makes this cause of action qualitatively different from one for copyright."); Computer
Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 719 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a trade
secret action was not preempted because "where the use of copyrighted expression is
simultaneously the violation of a duty of confidentiality established by state law, that
extra element renders the state right qualitatively distinct from the federal right, thereby
foreclosing preemption under section 301"); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893
F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990) ("This action for breach of contract involves an element in
addition to mere reproduction, distribution or display: the contract promise made by
Taquino, therefore, ... is not preempted."); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d
923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract entails a distinct cause of
action which is clearly not within the subject matter of copyright....").
240. But see Karjala, supra note 86, at 531 ("Mass-market adhesion 'licenses' clearly
fail the test insofar as they purport to extend or expand federal copyright rights ...
241. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
242. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 131 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5747 (stating intent "to make clear, consistent with the 1964 Supreme Court decisions in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., that
preemption does not extend to causes of action, or subject matter outside the scope of the
revised Federal copyright statute" (citations omitted)).
243. See Hardy, supra note 31, 35 ("Because it is as of yet unsettled whether or not
this more general doctrine of preemption exists independently of the Copyright Act's
section 301, the possibility that it may be used to invalidate certain contractual provisions
remains strong.").
244. Courts have had little need to refer to the Supremacy Clause since § 301 became
law in 1976, because now they can "simply turn to the explicit statutory language." 1
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 1.01[B], at 1-9; see also 3 GOLDSTEIN, supra note
90, § 15.3.3, at 15:35 to 15:36 ("Arguably, section 301 has entirely displaced constitutional
preemption doctrine under the supremacy clause in cases involving state protection of
copyright subject matter."). Cases applying the Supremacy Clause to questions of the
Copyright Act's preemptive power have almost solely concerned state statutes
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Supremacy Clause preemption' leave the supposition unresolved,
however.2'
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Supremacy Clause to
open several avenues to preemption. First, Congress can preempt
state law "by so stating in express terms."' 7 Congress has said
nothing to bar the sorts of fared use contracts at issue here, though.2'
Second, preemption may take place when "federal regulation is
sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that
Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state regulation." '249 This
description hardly fits copyright, however, which continues to enjoy
protection-albeit solely for unfixed works-at common law. What
about state protection for fixed works? That Congress has not seen
fit to attack the ample authority upholding contracts under § 301'
indicates that here, too, Congress has "left room" for fared use
contracts.2'
Third, federal law may preempt a state law that "actually
conflicts" with federal law because the state law "stands 'as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.' ' 2 This test arguably frames
particularly directed toward regulating intellectual property. See, e.g., Association of Am.
Med. Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519, 532 (2d Cir. 1991); Associated Film Distrib. Corp.
v. Thornburgh, 800 F.2d 369, 375 (3d Cir. 1986); American Soe'y of Composers, Authors,
& Publishers v. Pataki, 930 F. Supp. 873, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). These fail to shed much
light on the issue of the Supremacy Clause's impact on fared use contracts. But see F.E.L.
Publications, Ltd. v. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 466 F. Supp. 1034, 1046
(N.D. Ill. 1978) (applying the Supremacy Clause to find that "[t]he copyright laws do not
protect a licensing program instituted by a copyright owner" and that therefore,
"defendants' preemption argument is inappropriate").
245. For a notoriously winding line of cases applying Supremacy Clause preemption
doctrine to patent law, see Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
159-60 (1989), Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964), and Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,231 (1964).
246. "Nonetheless, it remains true that the vast bulk of copyright contractual issues
must be resolved under state law, given the silence of the Copyright Act in addressing
such issues.... " 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 1.01[B][3][a], at 1-44.7.
247. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) (citing
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,525 (1977)).
248. Congress came closest to such an express statement in § 301, which leaves ample
room for contracts to modify copyright's default rules. See supra Part IV.B.3.
249. California Fed Say. & Loan, 479 U.S. at 280-81 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947)).
250. See supra Part IV.B.3.
251. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553 (1973) ("The clause of the
Constitution granting to Congress the power to issue copyrights does not provide that
such power shall vest exclusively in the Federal Government. Nor does the Constitution
expressly provide that such power shall not be exercised by the States.").
252. California Fed. Say. & Loan, 479 U.S. at 281 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
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preemption in terms sufficiently broad to pose a threat to anti-
criticism contracts enforced by ARM as part of a widespread system
of fared use. Suppose that in practice and in the aggregate, such
contracts would render the fair use defense largely inapplicable.
Would this result thwart the "purposes and objectives" that led
Congress to enact § 107 in particular, and the Copyright Act in
general?
Here we enter the realm of conjecture. As one court has noted,
"[i]t is possible to hypothesize situations where application of
particular state rules of [contract] construction would so alter rights
granted by the copyright statutes as to invade the scope of copyright
law or violate its policies.""3  This hypothetical has, however,
remained exactly that: a mere hypothetical. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has made clear that preemption arguments have a
high hurdle to cross before they begin to threaten contracts between
private parties: "Commercial agreements traditionally are the
domain of state law. State law is not displaced merely because the
contract relates to intellectual property.... ""4
The Supreme Court has regarded state laws specifically
regulating intellectual property with far less solicitude than it has
contracts that, backed by state law, affect rights to intellectual
property.' Some commentators thus have argued that the Supreme
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). "Actual conflict" can also arise if "compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). The same sort of analysis applied under § 301 would
presumably prevent this formulation of the test from preempting fared-use contracts,
however. See supra Part IV.B.3.
253. Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int'l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479,483 (5th Cir. 1981). The
court's reference to "copyright law or... its policies" indicates that it has both § 301 and
the Supremacy Clause in mind. See id. ("[A]pplication of Georgia rules to determine
parties' contractual intent is not preempted by [the] copyright act nor does their
application violate federal copyright policy.").
254. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257,262 (1979).
255. Compare Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155
(1989) (holding that a state law protecting boat hulls from copying was preempted by
federal law), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) (holding
that a state unfair competition law was preempted by patent law), and Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,231 (1964) (same), with Aronson, 440 U.S. at 266 (holding
that a contract affecting rights to a patent was not preempted). Professor Merges notes
that preemption,
which has been applied almost exclusively to overturn state legislation, has in
theory been available as a limit on the terms that parties can include in a private
contract; but no court-so far as I can determine-actually has ever used this
principle to render unenforceable a particular licensing agreement.
Robert P. Merges, Expanding Boundaries of the Law: Intellectual Property and the Costs
of Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1610 (1995) (footnote
omitted) (reviewing PETER A. ALcEs & HAROLD F. SEE, THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF
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Court should preempt form contracts that so pervade the market as
to amount to "private legislation." 6 The Supreme Court appears
highly unlikely to accept this invitation, however. The Court has
shown great unwillingness to expand the definition of "state
action"-particularly with regard to the private resolution of
commercial disputes.2 It explained that "even if we were inclined to
extend the sovereign-function doctrine outside of its present carefully
confined bounds, the field of private commercial transactions would
be a particularly inappropriate area into which to expand it.""
Because ARM's power to thwart unauthorized use will often make
recourse to litigation unnecessary, moreover, it looks even less likely
to qualify as state action. Tm
The question of Supremacy Clause preemption of fared use
contracts thus remains unresolved and probably involves too many
variables to ever allow an easy answer, much less at this far remove. °
The burden of proof of course will fall on those who would use
preemption to force open access to others' copyright works."
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1994)).
256. See Merges, supra note 255, at 1613 ("Standard form software licensing contracts,
by virtue of their very uniformity and the immutability-in other words, non-
negotiability-of their provisions, have the same generality of scope as the state
legislation that is often the target of federal preemption. Furthermore, these contracts
have the same effect as offending state legislation: wholesale subversion of an important
federal policy.... [W]hen a licensing provision in contravention of the federal statute has
become totally pervasive... the statute [might] preempt it."); see also Cohen, supra note
7, at 1022 (criticizing the NIICPA on grounds it "superimposes upon the existing
framework of copyright and contract law an additional layer of private legislation
regarding the terms and conditions of access to copyrighted works"). But see supra note
226 (criticizing the "private legislation" metaphor).
257. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,163 (1978).
258. Id.
259. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) ("[A] State normally can be held
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in
law be deemed to be that of the State. Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives
of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible .... " (citations
omitted)).
260. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 1.01[B][3][c], at 1-44.13
(commenting that its "many twists and turns" demonstrate "how murky copyright pre-
emption issues can be"). But see Karjala, supra note 86, at 54041 (arguing that because
enforcement of a "purported 'contract' on widely distributed products" would "frustrate[]
basic federal copyright policy honed by the courts over decades and to a significant
degree codified in the 1976 Act," the Supremacy Clause preempts enforcement of such a
contract).
261. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,281 (1987) (citing
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) ("Consideration under the Supremacy
Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state
law.")) ("[P]re-emption is not to be lightly presumed."); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
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Nonetheless, for reasons discussed above, there remains a non-
negligible chance that courts will interpret the fair use doctrine to
require that copyright owners put up with objectionable uses. 2 The
next Subpart thus proposes an exit strategy that both protects the
integrity of copyright law and liberates mutually consenting adults to
give and receive information as they see fit.
C. Exit from Copyright
The NIl White Paper? and the legislation it begate have drawn
criticism for rushing to impose uniform solutions to problems that
remain poorly understood.' Even commentators who disagree
about the proper role and scope of copyright agree that federal
authorities should give private parties time to craft their own
solutions.26  Professor Samuelson has suggested that we "[1]et
copyright owners use technology to build 'fences' around their works
and explore new markets. If the fences they use are inadequate to
protect against market failure, there will be time enough to adopt
appropriate legislation."' 7 The U.S. Register of Copyrights likewise
F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Although Congress possesses power to preempt even
the enforcement of contracts about intellectual property... courts usually read
preemption clauses to leave private contracts unaffected."); see also Hardy, supra note 31,
37 ("[As originally conceived, copyright law was] to be exercised like any other
property right, in any way the owner saw fit, with a correspondingly wide scope for
contractual variation in license terms, fees or sales price.").
262. See supra Part III.B.
263. NI1 WHITE PAPER, supra note 7.
264. See S. 1284,104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2441,104th Cong. (1995).
265. This over-eager response appears most clearly in the Nl White Paper's call to
redefine "distribution" and "publication" in the Copyright Act to include "transmission."
See Nil WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 213-17; see also S. 1284 § 2 (involving proposed
amendments to §§ 101, 106(3) of the Copyright Act); H.R. 2441 § 2 (same). It likewise
appears in the Nil White Paper's zealous protection of copyright management
information. See NIH WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 230-33, App. at 4-6; see also S. 1284
§ 4 (providing civil and criminal penalties for circumventing copyright protection systems
and for giving false copyright management information); H.R. 2441 § 4 (same). Having
thus raised the ceiling on copyright protection, the Nil White Paper readily defers to
private efforts: "Copyright owners should be free to determine what level or type of
protection (if any) is appropriate for their works." NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at
233.
266. See, e.g., Okerson, supra note 85, at 84 ("Progress in the creation and distribution
of electronic information is being made nicely, though not rapidly.... Many believe the
technology is not mature enough for agreement about fair use guidelines."); Post,
Controlling Cybercopies, supra note 9, at 45. But cf. Cohen, supra note 7, at 998-1000,
1031-38 (forecasting effects on consumers' privacy of private ordering, and
recommending remedial legislation).
267. Samuelson, Technological Protection, supra note 14, at 33; see also Samuelson,
The Copyright Grab, supra note 14, at 191 ("It would be more sensible to wait to see what
kinds of markets emerge and then figure out what, if any, legal fences are needed .... ").
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has argued against premature legislative attempts to update fair use
for digital intermedia.'
Attempts to abort the development of fared use would merit
similar criticism. Private parties must have free rein to explore
technological and contractual answers to the problems of protecting
information in the new digital intermedia.' 9 At this early stage, we
can predict neither the solutions that entrepreneurs will discover nor
the systemic effects of their various, individual experiments. Few
people will object to anti-censorship contracts. Even anti-criticism
contracts deserve a presumption of enforceability, however.
Though third-party commentators and lawmakers might frown
on some types of fared use contracts, they should refrain from
banning them. They should instead require merely that those who
would rely on such contracts choose between copyright law and
contract law. Suppose, in other words, that the worst-case scenario
described above comes to pass,2m and that contracts under fared use
develop so as to leave copyright's traditional concern for the public
interest wholly unrepresented in digital intermedia.271 The proper
response would not invalidate such agreements, and thereby punish
private parties for quite naturally pursuing their private interests.
The proper response would instead withdraw copyright's public
benefits. Information providers who prefer contract to copyright
would have to rely on ARM to protect their wares, which otherwise
would fall into the public domain.22 Those who prefer copyright
268. See Mary Beth Peters, U.S. Register of Copyrights, Letter to the Chairman of
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property in Response to Questions Concerning
the National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act, Answer to Question 4
(Feb. 15, 1996) <tp'/ftp.loc.govlpub/copyrightcpypubniistat.html> ("The questions
posed for fair use in the digital environment are therefore not a problem of statutory
language, but relate instead to judicial interpretation of the doctrine in the differing
environment of digital communications, and to the ability to take advantage of the fair
use privilege in an encrypted digital world.").
269. "The marketplace should be allowed to develop whatever legal licensing systems
may be appropriate for the NII." NIl WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 53.
270. See supra Part II.C.
271. Such an extreme result appears highly unlikely. "Commercial copyright owners
seem a long way from suing libraries or elementary schools." Okerson, supra note 85, at
84. Social sanctions alone limit over-zealous copyright enforcement. Consider how
public outcry forced "Ascap, gasping .... to issue a press release saying it never intended
to charge for campfire sing-alongs, and that it 'has never brought nor threatened to bring
suit against the Girl Scouts.'" Elisabeth Bumiller, Battle Hymns Around Campfires:
Ascap Asks Royalties from Girl Scouts, and Regrets It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1996, at B
(quoting Ascap's press release).
272. Professor Merges argues that contract offers scant competition to copyright as a
means of protecting proprietary information in digital media. "[T]he argument for the
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would have to forego overly restrictive contracts.27
In broad terms, this option to exit 4 copyright law would apply
only to fared use contracts otherwise barred by preemption. The
exact details of implementing this program obviously deserve
thoughtful input from many points of view.25 The drafters of the
proposed UCC-2B27 could certainly stir discussion by considering a
new § 10 4 (c):' "Any party to a contract governed by this title but
preempted by copyright law may enforce the contract if that party
permanently abandons any rights and remedies arising under
copyright law to the subject matter of the contract."' 8
Amending UCC-2B ultimately would prove futile, however,
because-even if adopted by each state-the UCC exercises little
more than an advisory influence on federal lawmakers. A more
complete and effective reform would therefore amend § 301 of the
federal Copyright Act' 9 by adding something like the foliowing sub-
section: "(g) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or
remedies that a party enjoys under contract law if said party
permanently abandons any rights and remedies arising under
dominance of contract has one serious flaw: it fails to address the problem of rights
against those who are not in contractual privity." Merges, supra note 255, at 19. He does
not, however, address the impact of advanced ARM on this problem. Cf. Ginsburg,
supra note 118, at 63 ("If access to works could be obtained only through the information
provider (directly or through an authorized online distributor) no 'third parties' to the
contract would exist.").
Professor Lemley observes of the contract option in the analogous case of shrinkwrap
license, "I suspect that copyright owners would find this an unattractive alternative,
however, and that in fact they would prefer to 'pick and choose' only the copyright rules
that benefit them." Lemley, supra note 156, at 1274.
273. Cf Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-90 (1974) (discussing the
wisdom of letting state trade secret law provide an alternative to federal patent law as a
means of encouraging innovation).
274. For seminal discussions of the importance of the right and power to exit
regulatory schemes, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970),
and Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
275. Excessive opportunism, for example, would need to be avoided. One possible
solution would be that information providers should have to abide by one choice for each
class of contracts, rather than for each individual agreement or contractual term. Of
course, the outcome of deliberations to solve such problems matters little if, as the
analysis above suggests, preemption poses scant threat to fared use contracts. See supra
Part IV.B.3-4.
276. See U.C.C. § 2B-104(c) (Discussion Draft Apr. 14,1997).
277. Sections 104(a)-(b) currently concern "Transactions Subject to Other Law." Id.
278. It remains uncertain whether the sorts of ARM-enabled agreements discussed in
this Article would fit best under the UCC-2B's definition of access contracts, § 102(a)(1),
or of mass-market licenses, § 102(a)(25). Depending on the particular transaction and
technology used, either might apply.
279. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
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copyright law to the subject matter of that contract."
Congress already has made explicit its willingness, in the context
of the first sale doctrine, to force copyright owners to decide between
contract law and copyright law.2' The amendment to § 301 proposed
here would merely make that Hobson's choice generally available. A
measure such as this proposed amendment could open up
alternatives to an outright ban on any fared use contract that skirts
preemption. Policy makers therefore can-and should-let fared use
develop unhindered, interfere with private arrangements only on
proof of imminent peril to the public interest, and provide the
freedom to exit from a statutory regulatory scheme to contractual
ones.
To the extent that information providers and consumers opt to
manage expressive works solely by contract, they will deregulate
(more aptly, "re-regulate") access to expressive works.m Their
various private agreements will supplant the allocation of fights that
copyright's fair use doctrine formerly required. This prediction raises
an interesting choice: should we favor private agreements, or a state
law, when it comes to controlling the creation, dissemination, and use
of expressive speech? Commentators and courts largely agree on
how to answer this question in the First Amendment context. No
such consensus exists in the context of copyright, however. M  Indeed,
280. Query, however, whether even this would forestall preemption under the
Supremacy Clause.
281. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5693 (commenting that the first sale doctrine set forth in § 109 "does not mean that
conditions on future disposition of copies or phonorecords, imposed by a contract
between their buyer and seller, would be unenforceable between the parties as a breach
of contract, but it does mean that they could not be enforced by an action for
infringement of copyright"); see also Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51
(1908) (expressing willingness to uphold valid contract claim despite applicability of the
first sale doctrine); American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir.
1978) (holding that the "first sale" does not make first or subsequent buyer an infringer,
but copyright owner retains right to sue for breach of contract accompanying sale);
United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 n.10 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that after first
sale, vendee violating agreement with vendor "may be liable for the breach but he is not
guilty of infringement").
282. We might say that consumers and providers will "contractualize" copyright. We
would not say that they "privatize" it because copyrights already rest in private hands.
283. Although Professor Netanel recognizes the value of voluntary associations in
sustaining civil society, see Netanel, supra note 22, at 341-47, he clearly wants the State to
regulate what consenting adults do with copyrighted works. Netanel sometimes speaks
quite broadly, saying for example that under his "democratic paradigm ... the limits to
copyright's duration and scope represent the outer bounds not only of copyright
protection, but also of other forms of private control over publicly disseminated
expression." Id. at 363; see also id. at 385 (arguing that the public policy of the Copyright
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scarcely anyone even asks the question in those terms. m
V. CONCLUSION
Academics view with horror the prospect that automated rights
management may limit copyright's fair use defense. But academics
have a peculiar affection for fair use. It gives them the valuable right
to use others' copyrighted works generously and free of charge.
Furthermore, academics themselves suffer scant harm from fair use
because they have few licensing fees at risk. In fact, academics
typically prefer that others copy, read, and cite their works freely.w
Such special incentives do not encourage academics to regard fared
use with disinterested eyes. Only a comprehensive and objective
view can accurately assess ARM's impact on the fair use defense,
copyright law, and the public interest.
This Article has argued that a confluence of new ARM
technologies and existing legal doctrines stand ready to radically
reduce the scope of the fair use defense-and that, on reflection, this
should horrify no one. In the place of fair use, a reciprocal quasi-
compulsory license will likely come to define rights to expressive
works in the digital intermedia. A balanced accounting reveals that,
whether in its default mode or specially modified by contract, this
Act should not be subordinated to market demands and private contract). Strictly
speaking, however, it remains unclear how he would regard civil associations that forsake
copyright altogether and allocate rights to expressive works solely by contract, since he
does not consider the exit option set forth here.
Similarly, although Professor Karjala argues emphatically "that copyright cannot be
simply a 'default position' against the background of which copyright owners and users
should be fully free to make variations by contract," Karjala, supra note 86, at 521, he
bases this argument on the assumption that to hold otherwise would give copyright
owners the double benefit of copyright and contract. "The free use of unprotected
elements of such works ... [is] the quid pro quo that benefit[s] the public in exchange for
the public's recognition of the exclusive rights of copyright." Id. It thus remains unclear
how he would regard contracts enforced only after abandonment of overlapping copyright
claims.
284. This Article can do little more than stir curiosity about the question-and
mention that the author has begun trying to answer it.
285. The court in Princeton University Press took due note of "the assertions of
numerous academic authors that they do not write primarily for money and that they
want their published writings to be freely copyable." Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan
Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1391 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336
(1997). It disregarded such assertions, however. "It is the publishers who hold the
copyrights, of course-and the publishers obviously need economic incentives to publish
scholarly works, even if the scholars do not need direct economic incentives to write such
works." Id.; see also American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that "authors have a far greater interest in the wide
dissemination of their work than in royalties"), affid, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), cert.
dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995).
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system of fared use would generate considerable net benefits and
distribute them equitably.
In comparing fair use to fared use we might well ask, "which
allows 'freer use'?" Fair use seems freer to academics and others who
regularly use copyrighted works because, quite simply, nobody
demands payment. But such use comes "for free" only in a very
superficial sense. More careful scrutiny demonstrates that fair use
imposes costs on consumers via risk of suit, on copyright owners via
uncompensated uses, and on society as a whole via transaction costs.
The alternative presented by fared use, because it can liberate us
from a copyright system rotten with uncertainty, in fact offers freer
access to expressive works.
As copyright owners and consumers contract around the default
rules for fared use, they will experiment with a wide variety of
methods for managing information in the digital intermedia. A full
assessment of this exploratory and entrepreneurial process must
await our observations of actual results. We can assume, however,
that copyright owners and consumers will modify fared use's
reciprocal quasi-compulsory license only when they find it mutually
beneficial to do so. Their agreements thus deserve a presumption of
enforceability. If federal preemption threatens to negate that
presumption, lawmakers should protect continued experimentation
by opening an exit route from copyright law to contract law.
Neither lawmakers nor academics can expect to dictate the
single best means of regulating online access to expressive works.
The necessary information-information that would give policy-
makers a shortcut to the future-hardly "wants to be free." To the
contrary, such information cannot yet be had at any price. It must
come from those who actually participate in the market for
information, and it will appear in the mosaic of their diverse
experiments and agreements. Only by patiently studying their
evolved preferences, in the fine and in the aggregate, will we discern
which types of rights best suit the new digital intermedia.
1998] 619

